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ABSTRACT 
With the explosion of available data from a variety of 
sources, it has become increasingly difficult to keep pace 
with the amount of arriving data, extract actionable 
information, and integrate it with prior knowledge.  Add to 
that the pressures of today’s fusion center climate and it 
becomes clear that analysts, police officers, and 
executives’ ability to make rapid, sound decisions is 
severely compromised. 
The combination of circular reporting and the 
complexity of data sources are contributing to information 
overload.  Law enforcement agencies realize this cannot be 
resolved by continuing to hire more intelligence analysts.  
Instead, they must begin leveraging technology.  The 
Illinois State Police is utilizing a technology artifact in 
its Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) which 
incorporates technology built from the context of these 
users.  This thesis uses a survey instrument to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this technology on reducing circular 
reporting and the handling of complex data sources. 
The findings conclude that intelligence analysts within 
STIC perceive that information overload exists, and both the 
complexity of data sources as well as circular reporting 
minimizes their effectiveness and efficiency.  Furthermore, 
this technology effectively improves these negative effects, 
and increases the STIC’s ability to better serve 
communities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
In recent years, rapid advances in the field of 
information and communication technologies have led to the 
emergence of new technology that is transforming the world 
into a data driven society.  Unstructured text in the form 
of emails, web pages, and word processing documents has 
become overwhelming and has created significant obstacles in 
extracting meaningful, actionable information used for 
decision-making. 
Today’s fusion centers are faced with an urgent need to 
efficiently and effectively build on prior information 
providing analysts, police officers and executives the 
ability to make timely and accurate decisions.  The primary 
barrier to achieving this goal is effectively managing 
information overload. 
The problem with most technological solutions to the 
information overload problem is that the contributing factor 
cannot be clearly mapped to a particular process.  Rather, 
it is manifested, in the large collection of interdependent 
processes that are inherently related to a person’s tasks, 
information needs, environment, and role. 
Most technology solutions focus on a particular process 
and do not consider the interdependencies between processes 
that create these problems.  No one specific solution to 
this information overload problem exists, nor does just one 
problem exist. 
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This thesis will focus on the information overload 
problem that exists within state intelligence fusion 
centers, including specifics about how these problems 
manifest at the Illinois State Police (ISP) Statewide 
Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC).  These problems 
are described as “Circular Reporting” and “Complexity of 
Data Sources.” 
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Along with the explosion of available data from the 
Internet, news feeds, internal data sources, sensors and 
other emerging forms of data, it has become increasingly 
difficult to keep pace with the amount of arriving data, 
extract actionable information, and integrate it with prior 
knowledge (manually).  Add to that the pressures of today’s 
fusion center climate —multi-tasking, long hours, limited 
resources, mental fatigue— and it becomes clear that 
analysts, police officers and executives’ ability to make 
rapid, sound decisions is severely compromised.  Decision-
makers faced with this blitz of information know that in 
order to make timely and effective decisions, they must 
analyze and respond to information quickly. 
Both law enforcement and the business sector have been 
challenged to keep pace with the amount of information that 
is being made available to them.  Illinois State Police 
Senior Intelligence Advisor Aaron Kustermann estimates that 
“65-80 percent of analysts’ time is spent gathering and 
collating data with only a small percentage of time 
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remaining for true analysis”.1  This compromises the 
decision-making process at both the executive and tactical 
intelligence levels, putting in jeopardy our ability to 
accurately conduct long-range, strategic planning and 
proactively address crime.  Further worsening the problem is 
the fact that budgets available for staffing increases 
remain flat, while the amount of information available 
continues to increase exponentially. 
The media is rife with reports and complaints about 
information overload.  It is viewed as a symptom of our 
technologically savvy society, and is pervasive, affecting 
people in every occupation.  Attempts to deal with 
information overload range from advice about work habits to 
time management to stress relief to the application of more 
technology.  All too often the latter not only does not 
solve the problem, it makes it worse.  In particular, many 
technological approaches to solutions simply provide one 
more place where you have to go for information, provide yet 
one more report you have to read, and so on. 
The problem with most technological approaches to the 
information overload problem is that the contributing factor 
is not just one information problem.  The “problem” 
manifests itself in a variety of ways, and is actually a 
large collection of problems, which are inherently related 
to a person’s tasks, information needs, environment, and 
role in his or her organization.  The following quotation 
from BulletinNEWS, 
                     
1 Aaron Kustermann, (Senior Intelligence Advisor, Illinois State 
Police) interview by author, November 17, 2006. 
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Overload.  When your executives receive too much 
information, they either waste significant time 
wading through it all, or worse, ignore it 
altogether.  That ignorance and resultant loss of 
competitive edge can be very costly when it’s 
time to make important decisions.  Clipping 
services do little to solve this problem, and 
arguably make it worse.  A newspaper article 
provided as part of a clipping service might 
include a piece of information valuable to the 
company only in its 17th paragraph, but each 
executive of this company is forced to find this 
nugget by reading the whole story, much of which 
is valueless.2  
shows one example of this; the use of the technology-based 
news clipping service still does not solve the problem for 
the harried executive or for his organization.  There is 
still too much time wasted in reading and searching for 
“nuggets.”  What is missing in the solution is some 
contextual knowledge of what constitutes a “nugget” 
(relevance to mission, role, and task) and a design of a 
solution that reflects personal and organizational workflow 
and time management needs. 
To note a specific manifestation of an information 
overload problem one might use the cliché, “the devil is in 
the details.”  In order to deal with those details, a 
particular solution must be constructed to address the 
situation, as well as a contextual and task-specific 
understanding of the specifics.  No one specific solution to 
this “information overload” problem exists, as not just one 
problem exists.  Information Overload problems occur in 
every conceivable variety of contexts, and cannot be solved 
                     
2 “Corporate News Briefings.” BulletinNEWS, 
http://www.bulletinnews.com/corporate_briefings.htm (accessed December 
2, 2007) 
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with a single solution; by way of analogy, consider a 
problem of “Faster Transportation.”  A solution to providing 
“Faster Transportation” could involve anything from an F/A-
18 Hornet to a C5 Galaxy to a Virginia-class submarine to an 
XM1108 Universal Carrier to a V150 TGV high-speed train to a 
Bugatti Veyron automobile to a Lightning F-40 bicycle.  The 
“right” solution can only be determined by examining and 
understanding the contextual and task specific needs.  There 
is no single “Information Overload” problem anymore than 
there is a single “Faster Transportation” problem. 
Examples have been revealed throughout the literature 
suggesting other agencies are struggling with similar 
challenges.  Further evidence in support of this issue can 
be found in Kelderman’s report, “Federal, state and local 
law enforcement agencies are building or improving 
information-sharing programs to prevent terrorist attacks 
and improve police work.  A process that trades stronger 
vigilance for complaints of information overload.”3 
Kelderman describes a situation in which a naïve 
approach that constructs a solution to information sharing 
using technology without considering the other contextual 
factors necessary for crafting an effective solution can, in 
fact, make things worse.  Important national strategic 
objectives are being hindered by neglecting these other 
crucial factors when creating specific contextually 
sensitive solutions. 
                     
3 Eric Kelderman, "Law Enforcement Linking Tangled Information," 
Stateline.org, 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=
1&contentId=15500 (accessed January 31, 2007). 
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At the Federal level, we find further evidence of the 
issues caused by information overload.  For instance, “A big 
part of the problem is that intelligence agencies, including 
the FBI, simply collect too much information and can't sift 
through it effectively.  Figuring out how to deal with 
information overload is a key management challenge.”4 
Enterprises at all levels of government and the 
private sector are creating, collecting, and 
storing more data than ever before.  The trend 
extends across the globe.  According to a U.C.-
Berkeley estimate, more than five exabytes of new 
information (1018 bytes) are created every year 
worldwide – enough to fill 37,000 new Libraries 
of Congress and more than all 
the words ever spoken or printed.  This is the 
annual equivalent of a 30 foot stack of books for 
every man, woman, and child on the planet.5 
Following the tragic events of 9/11 the nation’s 
leaders insisted those responsible for public safety share 
information.  Little doubt exists that those entities are 
sharing more data. 
Perhaps nowhere is unstructured data piling up 
faster than at American security organizations 
tasked with winning the war on terrorism.  They 
are inundated with an unprecedented ‘volume, 
velocity and variety,’ or ‘3Vs,’ of data, causing 
massive ‘information overload” According to 
congressional testimony and other public sources, 
                     
4 Brian Friel, "Behind the Badge," GovExec.Com (December 1, 2001). 
http://www.govexec.com/features/1201/1201s3.htm (accessed April 20, 
2007). 
5 Scott Greiper and Mark Sauter, The Business of Connecting Dots: The 
$1 Billion Intelligence and Security Informatics/Analytics Market 
(Annapolis, MD: C.E. Unterberg, Towbin and Chesapeake Innovation Center, 
[2005]), 4. http://www.aatechcouncil.org/documents/ConnectingDots.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2007). 
 7
U.S. security agencies are collecting far more 
information than they are able to process.6 
It is incumbent upon the leaders in Homeland security 
to find a solution to the information overload problem that 
has emerged.  In what follows, we will explore some of the 
specific ways that information overload problems manifest 
themselves at the Illinois State Police. 
Beginning in early 2000 and continuing through 2002 
many metro-St. Louis, Missouri, law enforcement agencies 
were independently investigating dozens of murders.  These 
murders had many similarities, but the majority of the data 
had never been analyzed.  Once analysis began, certain 
important patterns developed such as sex, race, occupation, 
body concealment, last seen location, etc.; but there were 
other large amounts of information left unanalyzed, 
including but not limited to, thousands of reports written 
in several formats by numerous departments.  Those involved 
in the analysis determined that this constant information 
flow would quickly overwhelm them. 
At the same time in central Illinois, the ISP was 
preparing to open the Statewide Terrorism Intelligence 
Center.  The ISP realized the overwhelming responsibility of 
being accountable for the data contained in file cabinets, 
dozens of desperate databases, and the memories of 
employees. 
During conversations with policing professionals of all 
ranks and from all types of agencies it became apparent that 
                     
6 Greiper and Sauter, The Business of Connecting Dots: The $1 Billion 









each of them felt they were overloaded with data.  The 
practice known as “circular reporting” is filling in-boxes 
across the country; street officers, analysts and executives 
fear deleting the one critical piece of information that may 
make the difference.  It is commonplace for us to read the 
same information numerous times, reducing available time to 
focus on relevant issues. 
C. INFORMATION OVERLOAD EXPLAINED 
1. Circular Reporting 
Classic circular reporting occurs when two or more 
sources report the same information to an intelligence 








Figure 1.   Classic Circular Reporting 
If law enforcement officers are deluged with 
intelligence reports, the information overload 
will have the same outcome as not sharing 
information at all.  If officers are deleting 
 
                     
7 Kyle Teamey and Jonathan Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for 
Counterinsurgency," Military Review 86, no. 5 (September-October 2006): 
28. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct06/Teamey-
Sweet.pdf (accessed January 15, 2007). 
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intelligence products without reading them, then 
the effect is the same as if it had never been 
disseminated.8 
Another key element to the circular reporting problem 
is, of course, the duplication that exists among the 
multiple reports.  Compounding the issue is that not all 
reports are completely identical.  In the absence of a 
detailed reading of each incoming item and laborious note 
taking, it is nearly impossible to reliably extract 
meaningful sources of intelligence.  Many of the reports 
contain information that originated as open source 
intelligence (OSINT). 
The classic circular reporting problem happens when two 
or more sources report the same information to an 
intelligence agency, although it in fact originated from the 
same source9 (see Figure 1).  This not only leads to 
duplication, but it can over emphasize the importance of a 
piece of information, as the information provenance may not 
be readily available, i.e., it may not be apparent that the 
two or more reports originated from the same source. 
The most obvious example of circular reporting at the 
Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) of the 
Illinois State Police (ISP) is that of the Daily 
Intelligence Reports received at the STIC.  This also 
extends to the weekly and other periodic reports received 
                     
8 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, 
Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies ([Washington, DC]: U.S. Dept. 
of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2004), 86. 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1439 (accessed January 20, 
2007). 
9 Teamey and Sweet, Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency, 
28. 
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from various law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  In 
many cases the Daily Reports contain similar entries in 
regard to recent news events – events which are often 
already in the public domain in the form of an uncovered 
terror plot, a threat to a specific target, etc.  In some 
cases, redundant information was previously brought to the 
analysts’ attention via television, newspaper (print and on-
line), or other media sources.  Analysts and supervisors at 
the STIC have reported that the Daily Intelligence 
Bulletins, while containing valued intelligence, are not 
thoroughly read by each analyst. 
Due to time constraints and the number of Daily 
Reports, analysts often focus on just one or two from a 
source (such as Chicago JTTF, Virginia State Police, 
Massachusetts State Police, etc.) that is familiar to them 
based on a prior experience or success with it.  This 
phenomenon of selectively choosing certain reports to rely 
on has been observed at the STIC as evidence of the 
following example. 
A common issue experienced with the Daily Reports, and 
in fact any intelligence document stored on the STIC’s 
network repository, is the inherent difficulty of locating a 
valued document or specific portion of a document once 
stored in one of the hundreds of folders within the network 
repository.  The issue of specific relevance and extreme 
difficulty in tracking that topic once stored is common.  In 
one situation a supervisor requested information on a 
specific topic knowing he had earlier viewed it in an 
intelligence bulletin.  Five analysts were asked to look for 
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this information – they returned five different documents 
obtained from five different areas of the network 
repository. 
One of the key elements to this “circular reporting 
problem,” as experienced by the STIC, is the enormous total 
volume of reports, representing an information flow so vast 
it is impossible for the appropriate analysts to have the 
time to actually read much less comprehend and prioritize 
the reports.  The Illinois State Police is not alone; the 
Federal Government is also recognizing the increase in the 
number of reports that should be read.  “Collecting more 
information from more sources will require more federal 
analytical capability to prevent information overload.”10 
Another key element to the circular reporting problem 
is, of course, the duplication that exists among the 
multiple reports.  Compounding the issue is that not all 
reports are completely identical.  Some of the reports may 
include new information that was developed or became known 
later, while others may include value-added information 
supplied by a particular agency or published reports with 
special knowledge (see Fig. 2). 
 
                     
10 James B. Steinberg, Mary Graham and Andrew Eggers, Building 
Intelligence to Fight Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
September 2003), 5. http://www.brookings.org/comm/policybriefs/pb125.pdf 


















Figure 2.   ISP Circular Reporting – Intel Agencies 
In the absence of a detailed reading of each incoming 
item and laborious note taking, it is nearly impossible to 
reliably extract meaningful sources of intelligence, some of 
which may come across as incidental from one source but a 
major discovery when applied to another.  Many of the 
reports contain information that originated as open source 
intelligence (OSINT).  For example, information may be 
reported from a variety of news sources (wire services, 
newspaper websites, TV network websites, and copies via 
intelligence agencies) and additional information may flow 
in later, which may or may not contain new, updated 
information.  Various intelligence agencies may themselves 
pick up these reports and supplement them with additional 
information available on that topic from within their agency 
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Figure 3.   ISP Circular Reporting – Open Source Intel             
(OSINT) Flows 
Several analysts at the STIC have described the 
challenges they deal with to keep up with the pace of 
incoming intelligence sources.  To describe a few, some 
aspects are: 
The reports are organized by reporting agency (rather 
than topic) so to monitor “your topics” requires sifting 
efficiently through all reports.  Analysts tend to 
specialize in particular areas, e.g., one analyst may 
specialize in domestic hate groups, while another may 
specialize in Islamic terrorist groups; one analyst may be 
the local expert in bio-weapons and agro terrorism, while 
another focuses on violent crime, weapons, and the ‘E’ in 
CBRNE methods (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
high Explosive). 
Some people (supervisors, other management) must be 
aware of all topics, so it is extremely difficult to keep 
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track of all of the issues.  These people must try to read 
all the reports, and mentally audit what is new, what is 
important, what is redundant, and what is novel or unique. 
The large number of events reported makes it impossible 
to read about all of them.  No effective means exists to 
help determine which are most important and relevant for the 
analyst.  For instance, a former supervisor at STIC 
explained that when he first started at STIC, he diligently 
tried to read all the reports on the topic of explosions but 
even with concentrating primarily on that topic he was 
quickly overcome with information as the number of 
explosions occurring everyday in Illinois alone were too 
much to keep up with.  Early efforts at information sharing 
have, in fact, made the problem worse as the ease of 
reporting and sharing has inflated the volume of reports 
significantly and thereby produced redundant information.  
Many reports have become equivalent to clipping services as 
they attempt to put filters on information to gather the 
most essential elements of events.  The unfortunate 
consequence of this improvement is distinguishing redundancy 
from equivalency and equivalency from something unique among 
multiple sources.  As analysts work, their biggest fear is 
overlooking a unique component. 
The notes and annotations they wish to memorialize, 
must be dealt with manually, which further complicates 
indexing information that analysts have already read.  
Easily locating information (either current or past) is 
difficult with the ISP’s current setup.  Reports often come 
in email and are placed onto a shared network drive to 
facilitate access by multiple analysts.  Many events are 
 15
“cut-and-pasted” from reports by analysts into their own 
electronic filing system (usually Word documents in folders 
they have organized themselves). 
The quantity and complexity of information also makes 
it difficult to determine crime patterns between reported 
events, for example, do patterns or similarities exist 
between types of explosions, e.g., ingredients, locations, 
etc. 
2. Complexity of Data Sources 
Many cases or even topics of interest require extensive 
document and database collections.  These efforts often 
extend over long periods of time and involve many 
individuals. 
A shortcoming of current processes are effective tools 
that provide both great detail at the most granular level, 
as well as tools that provide an overview of the data.  In 
addition, other state agencies and municipal law enforcement 
entities have access to their own unique and valuable data 
sources.   
Increasingly, government and corporate customers 
are realizing that without innovative technology 
solutions, all these data sets will simply create 
‘information overload,’ at best wasting storage 
space and at worst clogging the decision making 
process or losing key clues that could enhance 
efficiency, prevent financial loss or – in the 
most significant case – forestall attack or win 
battles.11 
                     
11 Greiper and Sauter, The Business of Connecting Dots: The $1 
Billion Intelligence and Security Informatics/Analytics Market, 6. 
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The complexity of these data sources makes it difficult 
to determine relationships; for example, building link 
charts identifying relationships from various resources, 
handling massive quantities of information, identifying 
inconsistencies between interviews, and extrapolating 
timelines from them are all time-consuming and cumbersome to 
accomplish. 
The 20-minute work-up is a process in which an officer 
in the field may have made a traffic stop and needs an in-
depth workup on possible connections to terrorism or 
narcotics trafficking about an individual, their vehicle, 
and in the case of semi trucks, the owner(s) of the cab and 
trailer.  Legal restrictions establish how long such a field 
traffic stop can last.  Thus, extreme urgency ensues in 
accomplishing these tasks.  While not necessarily complex in 
theory, even activities such as the 20-minute work-up can be 
complex with regard to the types of queries and the 
multitude of data sources which could be (and often are) 
explored.  Senior analysts are quite skilled in the proper 
process and sequence of queries to submit in order to 
identify the most significant amount of information in the 
least amount of time. 
Current inefficiencies related to a 20-minute work-up 
include the need for multiple analysts to work 
collaboratively on a single call.  Basically, they split up 
the effort due, in part, to cumbersome data access issues 
with their systems to collect as much relevant information 
as possible in the permitted timeframe.  Standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) call for certain internal data sources to 
be queried on 20-minute work-ups, as well. 
 17
The ISP has identified more than 80 unique databases 
throughout the state which are “owned” by ISP personnel.  
This represents a tremendous amount of information, yet most 
analysts and users only have access to a handful of these 
data sources.  In addition, other state agencies and 
municipal law enforcement entities have access to their own 
unique and valuable data sources, not to mention the 
previously noted and valued information via the open web or 
paid subscription sources. 
The complexity of many cases makes it difficult to 
determine relationships.  The link chart pulls together 
information from various resources and gives the analyst a 
view of some of these relationships.  Also, complexity 
applies to the massive quantity of information associated 
with a particular case.  A good case in point may be a 
murder case the Illinois State Police investigated in 
Streator, Illinois.  Countless reports were completed over a 
period of two years by scores of investigators.  Thousands 
of documents were produced including transcripts of 
interviews with a variety of people (now captured as PDF 
files).  While extracting a list of all the names produced 
through interviews along with the prevalence of each as well 
as their interrelationship is extremely valuable, it is also 
inherently labor intensive.  This work is done by the ISP 
manually, and takes far too long.  Identifying 
inconsistencies between interviews and extrapolating 
timelines from them is another analysis that is time-
consuming and cumbersome to accomplish today. 
In summary, this thesis will evaluate if the people, 
the nature of their work, their goals, their roles, their 
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organizations, their experience and finally their training; 
in other words the “context” of the user needs to be the 
focus of solving the information overload problem as opposed 
to the traditional approach of focusing on the data and how 
it is structured and shared.  Hallowell explains that the 
personal, social, and organizational disruptions need to be 
factored into any solution geared toward information 
overload.12  Likewise, Buck suggests that the focus on the 
prevalence of too much information suggests a focus on the 
data, concluding the data is not the problem; the problem is 
a lack of time for the consumer 
to absorb and handle the data.  Exploiting a technology 
solution to work as the user works will assist in 
manipulating the volume of data that exists.13 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will study the effects of Circular 
Reporting and Complexity of Data sources and evaluate a 
context-based method used to mitigate information overload.  
Context-based methodology is a technology approach that may 
solve the information overload problem that is occurring 
within state fusion centers.  The information overload 
problem is one that will require an understanding, capturing 
and leveraging of the knowledge about the user’s context. 
Most attempts to solve the information overload problem 
have neglected the most critical pieces of any solution: the 
                     
12 Edward M. Hallowell, "Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People 
Underperform," Harvard Business Journal 83, no. 1 (January, 2005), 54-
62.  
13 Brian Buck, "Context: In Startups, Software, & Sense-Making." 
(Powerpoint, Distinguished Entrepreneur Lecture, University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign, January 19, 2006). 
 19
people, the nature of their work, their goals, their roles, 
their organizations, their experience, and finally their 
training.  In other words, the “context” of the user has 
been neglected.  In a highly technical field this is not 
unusual.  Researchers and practitioners have been trained in 
their own technical field, not in psychology, sociology, 
ethnography, and human factors.  The argument here is for an 
inclusive and multi-disciplinary approach to an inherently 
multi-disciplinary problem.  Technology developed around a 
context-based approach inverts the usual methodology.  
Instead of starting with the technology, and naively 
believing all problems will be solved if everyone could 
retrieve and share information with others, the context-
based approach starts with the user and the user’s tasks, 
roles, and goals.14  The contextual approach then dictates 
what type of analytics and visualizations need to be brought 
to bear to create an effective solution to a particular 
problem.  The “bibles” of information visualization by 
Edward Tufte (The Visual Display of Quantitative 
Information; Envisioning Information; Visual Explanations: 
Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative; and Beautiful 
Evidence)15 bring forth the concept that information 
visualizations represent visual answers to specific 
questions; the contextual approach is used to determine what 
                     
14 Keith Järvelin, Peter Ingerwesen and Nick Belkin, "Information 
Retrieval in Contexts" (Sheffield, England, SIGIR 2004 IRiX Workshop, 
July 29, 2004.) 
http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/context/IRinContext_WorkshopNotes_SIGIR2004.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2007). 
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are the important questions, and these questions determine 
which analytics and visualizations can serve to answer them. 
Every instance of information overload happens with a 
specific person, engaged in a specific task, with specific 
goals, engaged with specific information resources.  The 
incredible variety of these elements implies that there is 
no “one-size-fits-all” solution; the most effective solution 
will itself be very specific, and tailored to the user, 
task, role, goals, and sources. 
                     
15 For Tufte’s major works see: Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display 
of Quantitative Information, 2nd Edition, (Cheshire CT: Graphics Press, 
2001); Envisioning Information, (Cheshire CT: Graphics Press, 1990); 
Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative, 
(Cheshire CT: Graphics Press, 1997); Beautiful Evidence, (Cheshire CT: 
Graphics Press, 2006). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
With the explosion of available data from the Internet, 
news feeds, internal data sources, and sensors, it has 
become increasingly difficult to keep up with the amount of 
arriving data, extract actionable information, and integrate 
it with prior knowledge (manually).  Add to that the 
pressures of today’s fusion center climate —multi-tasking, 
long hours, limited resources, and mental fatigue— and it 
becomes clear that analysts, police officers and executives’ 
ability to make rapid, sound decisions is severely 
compromised by information overload.  As described in great 
detail within Chapter 1, the Illinois State Police believe 
that information overload is primarily created by two 
phenomena, circular reporting, and complexity of data 
sources. 
In the past we have attempted to address the problem of 
information overload by either adding analysts or by 
warehousing and then mining the warehoused data.  
Unfortunately, both approaches fell short of the desired 
objective -- utilization of a human-computer environment to 
address the problem of information overload.  By adding more 
analysts, the aim was to process greater volumes of 
information.  In utilizing this approach we have been 
disappointed to find that some decision-making simply cannot 
be divided among multiple workers.  In effect, all we have 
done is hire more workers to review and evaluate the same 
information, in essence just spreading the problem around.  
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More often than not, a decision related to complex 
circumstances must be made by an individual that 
incorporates all relevant details.  Asking multiple analysts 
to collaborate to produce a detailed model of this kind is a 
losing proposition since today’s analysts are already 
spending the majority of their time simply gathering 
information.  As a result, little time remains for actual 
analysis and sharing of information.  Further reducing the 
time available for analysis will not improve the quality of 
the intelligence gained from the data. 
For that reason, mining warehoused data is more 
appealing, though that strategy also suffers its own set of 
flaws.  According to Kustermann, unstructured data – 
anything that resides outside a database, including valuable 
data from emails, web pages, word processing documents, and 
more, and which are estimated to be 80 percent of the 
average intelligence data assets – are integral to 
operations but are by definition outside the reach of 
warehouse-mining tools.16  Finally, and crucially, 
conventional analytics operate in a user-driven mode on 
large volumes of historical data but cannot process real-
time streams to deliver up-to-the-minute results.  
Consequently, fusion centers are trapped in reactive, not 
proactive, decision-making environments. 
The problem of information overload is recognized as a 
problem within many fields, and as a result there are many 
categories of the literature that address parts of the 
problem.  The nature of the problem itself involves 
                     
16 Aaron Kustermann (Senior Intelligence Advisor, Illinois State 
Police), Interview by Author, November 17, 2006. 
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technology, people, and organizations, and it is not 
surprising that different specialized fields have attempted 
to tackle the portion of the information overload problem 
that lies within their domain. 
B. PRIMARY FIELDS 
Below are the primary fields that have conducted 
research studying various aspects of information overload.  
Although the phenomena of circular reporting and complexity 
of data sources are not new, there has been little written 
regarding their link to information overload. 
1. Information Science & Information Retrieval 
These two fields both deal with the collection, 
classification, retrieval, and dissemination of information.  
Strengths of this literature deal with making more effective 
mechanisms to organize and retrieve information.  Weaknesses 
lie in three areas: first, incorrectly assuming that having 
perfect classification of storage and precision & recall in 
retrieval solves the information overload problem (users can 
still be overwhelmed with vast amounts of very precisely 
relevant information); second, in not considering factors 
relating to the information needs and processing 
capabilities of users and their organizations; and third, in 
dealing primarily with the written word (unstructured data 
in the form of text) and not addressing issues regarding 
structured data. These fields do not deal with the “circular 
reporting” issue directly; the essence of circular reporting 
involves an analysis of actual content to identify which 
pieces of information are duplicative and which are not, and 
in particular involves how additional related information 
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and renditions of stories/news items change over time.  
Neither of these critical and nuanced essentials is dealt 
with in these two fields.  Neither of these two fields deals 
with “complexity of data sources” as it relates to 
structured data sources. 
2. Information Integration 
This field deals with the complexities involved in the 
technology side of bringing together various data sources.  
The strengths of this literature deal with the technological 
aspect of constructing solutions for the integration of 
structured (database) information issues.  Weaknesses 
involve assuming that if all systems have been integrated 
that overload issues are solved (not true, since additional 
analytics are needed to avoid analyst overload problems even 
with perfectly integrated systems); not dealing with text; 
and not considering factors relating to the information 
needs and processing capabilities of users and their 
organizations.  This field is not primarily concerned with 
unstructured data and text, and thus does not deal with 
issues of “circular reporting.”  This field does address 
parts of the “complexity of data” issue regarding 
technological integration, but does not deal with the 
analytical (e.g., entity analytics for resolving duplicate 
person records) or cognitive aspects. 
3. Information Architecture & the Semantic Web 
This field sprang out of work in the Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) and Usability fields which dealt with 
issues regarding the organization of and navigation within 
information environments.  Strengths include the user 
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information needs in the design of such environments.  
Weaknesses include the assumption that there will be a 
singular information environment and that overload issues 
can be addressed with proper organization and navigation; a 
lack of exploration of integration issues involving multiple 
systems and sources of data; and an assumption that the 
problem can be solved by the content creator/publisher, when 
in fact a key element of the problem involves the 
consumption of information from a large number of 
information sources over which there may be no control. This 
field does not deal with the specific of “circular 
reporting,” which involves the analysis and integration of 
multiple sources of textual data over time.  It does do some 
work on the issue of “complexity of data” as regards single 
data sources from cognitive aspects, but does not deal with 
multiple sources or data. 
4. Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), User Interface 
Design (UI) & Cognitive Psychology 
These fields are primarily about the effective design 
of interfaces for information interaction that take into 
account user information needs and user cognitive and 
perceptual abilities.  Strengths include the fundamental 
recognition that information overload problems are as much 
or more about user needs and capabilities as they are about 
technology issues.  Weaknesses include the fact that 
information overload manifests in many different ways 
depending on task, and the literature is short on 
substantive research on information overload specifically in 
intelligence analysis tasks; and the fact that analytics are 
not just effective and efficient interfaces for interaction 
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but are necessary to solve information overload problems.  
These fields teach cognitive principles of design that can 
be applied to solving “circular reporting” and “complexity 
of data” but the literature is sparse to non-existent 
regarding these two specific tasks/problem areas. 
5. Information Visualization & Visual Analytics 
These fields deal with the effective and usable design 
of complex graphical visualizations designed to afford 
insight and leverage human visual pattern recognition 
capabilities.  Strengths include the ability to represent 
complex and highly multidimensional information in a variety 
of effective ways.  Weaknesses include the inability to 
handle very large scale visualization (frequent in 
intelligence analysis); an emphasis on a data-directed 
approach to visualization construction rather than a focus 
on user information and decision-making needs; and a 
reliance on the human visual system to find patterns in a 
visualization as opposed to employing analytics to find 
patterns and using visualizations as visual explanations.  
The “circular reporting” issue is not addressed by this 
literature.  The “complexity of data” is addressed to some 
degree, but primarily with respect to visual representations 
of complex data and not regarding analytical or integration 
aspects. 
6. Intelligence Analysis 
This field deals with the study of policy, 
organizational, and analyst issues regarding the effective 
intelligence analysis processing cycle.  Strengths include 
some focus on specific tasks faced by analysts, although 
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there is some controversy within the literature regarding 
whether information overload is actually a problem.  
Weaknesses include a lack of emphasis on cognitive and 
perceptual aspects of information overload.  One aspect of 
the “circular reporting” issue is described (in the context 
of HUMINT source reporting provenance) but not the larger 
issues involving public media and agency dissemination.  The 
“complexity of data” issue is dealt with partially via 
descriptions and more from an organizational rather than 
individual analyst perspective, but not from an analytic, 
integrative or cognitive perspective. 
7. Organization Science 
This field deals with the study of effective decision-
making within organizations.  Strengths include the 
recognition of and original work on information overload as 
a problem situated within the context of organizational 
structures, business processes, and tasks; the description 
and study of the effects of the problem within 
organizations; and the exploration of remediation steps that 
can be taken by organizations and individuals to mitigate 
such effects.  Weaknesses include lack of literature dealing 
with increasing the ability of individuals and organizations 
to operate effectively in environments with a high degree of 
information flow, as opposed to finding ways to reduce the 
information flow to accommodate current limits.  The 
“circular reporting” issue is absent from this field’s 
research, and the “complexity of data” issue is partially 
described but technological and analytic research is not 
present. 
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8. Augmented Cognition 
This is an emerging field (most work within the last 
seven years or so) with a small literature base, founded on 
the proposition that much of the information overload 
problem source comes from a cognitive overload and can be 
addressed by detecting (physiologically) a user’s current 
cognitive processing state and by dynamically and 
selectively altering or reducing the information flow in 
response.  Strengths include the inherently multi-
disciplinary approach, but the literature is still small 
compared to the other fields.  Weaknesses include an 
emphasis on the forms of information overload that relate to 
cognitive overload, when there are many other manifestations 
of information overload.  This field does not deal with 
“circular reporting” at all.  This field does deal with the 
human cognitive aspects of “complexity of data” but 
exclusively with those aspects, not touching explicitly upon 
the integration and analytic aspects. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
An important characteristic about the literature 
regarding the problem of “information overload” is that 
there is not just one thread, but rather multiple views of 
the problem, each from the perspective of a different field, 
each with its own specific concerns.  Unfortunately, 
however, the nature of the information overload problem 
itself is inherently multi-disciplinary; it spans many 
disciplines because it involves technology, people, 
organizations, and their missions, roles, and tasks.  Thus, 
almost all of the literature is narrow and omits discussion 
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of many aspects of the problem.  Unexplored areas primarily 
relate to research involving combinations of these 
disciplines. 
Information overload manifests in many different ways 
that are particular to an organization’s mission, role, and 
tasks within which individual’s work.  The different 
categories of literature above have not dealt with the 
particulars of the “circular reporting” and the “complexity 
of data sources” problems.  Different fields deal with it in 
their literature, each from their own particular field’s 
perspective, but none addresses it holistically.  One is 
reminded of the parable of “The Blind Men and the 
Elephant,”17 as while there is a line of research within 
each of these disciplines somehow a collection of each 
discipline-specific view does not yield an overall one that 
comprehends the elephantine information overload problem.   
 
Figure 4.   The Blind Men and the Elephant18                 
(reprinted with permission) 
                     
17 For a reminder of the impact of the parable, see the poem written 
by John Saxte found at 
http://www.cs.rice.edu/~ssiyer/minstrels/poems/1179.html (accessed 
January 7, 2008). 
18 "The Blind Men and the Elephant," 
http://www.jainworld.com/education/juniors/junl19i1.gif (accessed 
November 7, 2007).   
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Next, this writing will define the components of the 
“information overload” problem in order to provide a context 
for examining the relationships within the various pieces of 
literature; it will explore the affinity between each 
component and a particular discipline; and then it will 
observe and comment on the various writings from each of 
these disciplines.  Finally, those few more recent multi-
disciplinary writings will be noted that come closer to 
addressing the problem as a whole. 
1. Information Collection, Organization 
By “some estimates it takes the world only 15 minutes 
to create a quantity of information equivalent to that 
currently held in the Library of Congress.”19  There is no 
question that the pace of information growth is 
accelerating, to the point where the perception of the 
information overload problem is pervasive.  It is 
traditional to think of the overload as consisting of 
structured information in databases and data warehouses, but 
the largest constituent, and fastest growing, is 
unstructured information (text): 
Colin White related the following facts:20 
• 80 percent of business is conducted on 
unstructured information (Gartner Group). 
• 85 percent of all data stored is held in an 
unstructured format (Butler Group). 
                     
19 Jonathan Spira, "Lost Knowledge: File Not found," KMWorld (2006)”,  
accessed February 2, 2007). 
20 Colin White, "Consolidating, Accessing and Analyzing Unstructured 
Data," Business Intelligence b-Eye Newsletter (December 12, 2005), 
http://www.b-eye-network.com/view/2098 (accessed February 1, 2007). 
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• Unstructured data doubles every three months 
(Gartner Group). 
• 7 million web pages are added every day 
(Gartner Group) 
Many observers think that enormous growth in 
unstructured information will itself be dwarfed by the 
coming growth in real-time streams of sensor information.21  
Refer to Harry Goldstein‘s commentary where he describes the 
vision/prediction of a “sensor planet of 2020 teems with 
billions of wireless ultra wideband communications nodes 
connected to countless pinhead size cameras, microphones, 
motion detectors, and biometric and other sensors to form a 
fine-grained mesh of networks that cover every square 
millimeter of the globe.”22 
Workers in Information Science and Information 
Retrieval are addressing this component of the information 
overload problem. 
2. Information Science 
Information science is “an interdisciplinary science 
primarily concerned with the collection, classification, 
manipulation, storage, retrieval and dissemination of 
                     
21 Vernor Vinge, "Synthetic Serendipity," IEEE Spectrum 41, no. 7 
(July 2004), 35-44. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ (accessed January 31, 
2007). 
22 Harry Goldstein, "Mike Villa’s World," IEEE Spectrum 41, no. 7 
(July 2004): 45. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ (accessed January 31, 
2007). 
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information.”23  The literature in this field includes works 
from several decades ago up through the current day.  There 
are some who controversially believe that the problem is 
simply one of insufficient training.  Bundy believes, that 
“people often lack the understandings and skills to 
identify, locate, access, evaluate, and then apply the 
needed information.”24  This is an extreme position along 
the continuum of literature in Information Science. 
Most of the works in this field deal with more 
effective methods in indexing, metadata creation, and 
search. 
3. Information Retrieval 
Information retrieval is itself an interdisciplinary 
field that is primarily concerned with the science of 
searching for documents and information within them, and 
incorporates aspects of “cognitive psychology, information 
architecture, information design, human information 
behavior, linguistics, information science, computer 
science, librarianship and statistics.”25 
                     
23 Ben Campbell, “Information Science,” Information Architecture 
Glossary, 
http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/Fall06/Campbell/resources/glossary.html 
(accessed February 1, 2007).  
24 Alan Bundy, "Drowning in Information, Starved for Knowledge: 
Information Literacy, Not Technology, is the Issue" (Melbourne, 
Australia, 10th VALA Biennial Conference and Exhibition, February 16-18, 
2000) http://www.vala.org.au/vala2000/2000pdf/Bundy.PDF (accessed 
January 24, 2007). 
25 Zdenka Linkova, “European Summer School in Information Retrieval 
ESSIR 2005,” Technical Report no. 949, (Institute of Computer Science, 
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2006) 
http://www.cs.cas.cz/cgi-
bin/extftp?ftp://ftp.cs.cas.cz/pub/reports/v949-06.pdf (accessed 
February 7, 2007). 
 33
This area has extensive literature, much of which 
focuses on algorithms for improved precision and recall in 
information retrieval.  The literature dates back into the 
middle of the last century wherein Gerard B. Salton’s 
writings26 form the basis for much work that followed, as 
well as much active work today.  The National Institute of 
Standards sponsored a series of conferences and competitions 
(Text Retrieval Conference, or TREC, described at 
http://trec.nist.gov/) for many years.  There are many other 
academic publications and conferences focused on various 
aspects of information retrieval. 
There is not much controversy within this sub-
literature, but there is a significant amount of ongoing 
innovation, much of it spurred by the growth of the Web.  
The most significant unexplored areas represent ones that 
typically are outside the primary interests of this 
discipline, which is focused on only one small part of the 
information overload problem, retrieval effectiveness. 
4. Information Integration 
The task of information integration involves bringing 
together various data sources (mostly structured databases) 
with a goal of enabling information fusion.  Many of the 
detailed activities involve database schema mapping, 
architectures for data integration, and more recently, the 
use of metadata and semantic technology to achieve a goal of 
semantic interoperability. 
                     
26 For more on Salton’s work see: Gerard Salton, “Export Systems and 
Information Retrieval,” ACM SIGIR Forum 21, no. 1 (March 1987): 3-9. 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=30076 (accessed January 7, 2008). 
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This literature, although active and with roots going 
back to the 1960s, is rather narrow from the perspective of 
the information overload problem.  An example is Information 
Integration for Counter Terrorism Activities: The 
Requirement for Context Mediation.  The focus of this type 
of work is on integration from a contextually driven 
perspective of intelligence analysts’ needs, but doesn’t 
explicitly address cause, issues, or remediation of 
information overload problems.27  Madnick’s work on the 
COntext INterchange (COIN) system and the concept of a 
Context Mediator is the most significant work28 in this 
field that moves outside the realm of purely technical and 
algorithmic concerns.  The importance of beginning to 
include the user and the user’s concerns, tasks, goals, and 
perceptual and cognitive capabilities bodes well for 
continued work in this field. 
5. Information Architecture 
This is a relatively young field, born in the 1990s 
around the birth and growth of the Web, and beginning to 
blossom in the last five years.  The literature is primarily 
about methods for design of information environments, using 
articulated design principles and leveraging metadata, 
                     
27 Nazli Choucri and others, “Information Integration for Counter 
Terrorism Activities: The Requirement for Context Mediation,” MIT Sloan 
Working Paper no. 4479-03, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Sloan School of 
Management, 2003). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=529703 (accessed 
February 1, 2007). 
28 Stuart E. Madnick and Lupu Mihai, “Using Semantic Web Tools for 
Context Interchange,” MIT Sloan Research Paper no. 4668-07, (Cambridge, 
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2007). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1075245 (accessed 
January 7, 2008) 
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taxonomies and ontologies to create environments that can 
meet specific user needs.29 
There is not much controversy in this field, but as a 
young research area it is still finding its own voice among 
the many related fields.  Much of the writing relates to 
technology issues, or strongly overlaps work in the HCI and 
Usability fields.  The extent to which this body of work 
deals with information overload is in the almost implicit 
assumption that having “more organized information 
environments” will be a, if not the, major factor in 
alleviating the problem.  Thus there is little exploration 
on the nature of the information overload problem per se. 
This author would characterize the Semantic Web work 
espoused by Tim Berners-Lee as dealing with a large-scale 
and Web-specific version of Information Architecture 
issues.30 
6. Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), User Interface 
Design (UI), Cognitive Psychology and Perceptual 
Capabilities 
These two components are combined, although UI Design 
focuses more on the production of artifacts for user 
interfaces and devices, and the latter component represents 
consideration of fundamental human capabilities, because the 
fields that deal primarily with these components tend to 
focus to a great degree on combinations of these.  HCI and 
Cognitive Psychology literature both deal extensively with 
                     
29 Alan Gilchrist and Barry Mahon, eds., Information Architecture: 
Designing Information Environments for Purpose (London: Facet 
Publishing, 2004). 
30 Tim Berners-Lee, "Semantic Web Road Map." 
http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/Semantic.html (accessed March 17, 2007). 
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these issues, although HCI tends to also deal with the 
design and evaluation of user interfaces and devices. 
Drucker, in a position paper for a conference workshop, 
does a good job of categorizing the issues.  Most 
importantly, he provides a description of some fundamental 
information tasks that form the milieu in which information 
overload problems manifest themselves.31  These tasks, 
although not domain specific in the sense of being concerned 
with intelligence analysts involved in counter-terrorism 
activities, nonetheless are an important move to understand 
the complexity of information overload via a “divide and 
conquer” approach that reflects the intrinsically varied and 
complex nature of the problem. 
HCI literature goes back decades and had its roots in 
human factors work involving such things as design of 
aviation displays, etc. 
7. Information Visualization 
The literature of Information Visualization draws 
heavily from its heritage in the use of computer graphics to 
display abstract visualizations of complex information, with 
a belief that the human visual pattern processing 
capabilities will be the key ingredient to help humans find 
structure in masses of complex data. 
                     
31 Steven M. Drucker, “Coping with Information Overload in the New 
Interface Era,” (Montreal, Canada, CHI2006, What is the Next Generation 
of Human Computer Interaction? April 23, 2006). 
http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~jacob/workshop/papers/drucker.pdf (accessed 
January 31, 2007).   
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Much of the computer related literature found its 
genesis in the work of Stuart Card and others at Xerox PARC 
going back to 1960s and 1970s, and continuing through the 
present day.  As previously stated, the preeminent voice in 
this field is Edward R. Tufte, whose four books are 
considered classics in this field.  
There are two schools of thought in this literature, 
which has engendered some controversy; one school focuses on 
the construction of information visualizations and tends to 
pay little attention to actual evaluation of the 
effectiveness of such visualizations; the other school not 
only is concerned with leveraging the knowledge from the 
literature on human cognitive and perceptual capabilities 
but also does concern itself with achieving more results and 
the production of pretty pictures. 
Where there is a weakness in this field it lies in the 
school that gives little attention to evaluation.  To some 
extent the newly christened subfield of Visual Analytics (in 
part, a euphemism coined in a post-TIA (Total Information 
Awareness) world for data mining, and in part characterized 
by a belief that visualization, more so than underlying 
analytics, can be a key to human understanding) has begun to 
spawn a literature focused on domain-specific tasks such as 
those facing intelligence analysts. 
8. Tasks, Goals, and Workflows 
A focus on the actual tasks, goals, and workflows of 
practicing intelligence analysts has been at the center of a 
body of literature growing for the last decade or so.  There 
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is some controversy, however, such as intelligence expert, 
Richard Heuer’s assertion,  
On the contrary, my own 30-plus years in the 
business of intelligence analysis biased me in 
favor of the view that, endless warnings of 
information overload notwithstanding, there is no 
such thing as too much information or expertise.32   
Despite the fact that Heuer’s work is one of the “bibles” of 
intelligence analysis; the rest of the literature recognizes 
there are many manifestations of information overload within 
the tasks, goals, and workflows of intelligence analysts. 
Some in this field only represents a situational 
positioning of what would otherwise be considered general 
literature from one of the other fields mentioned, without a 
deep exploration in the contextual nature of an analyst’s 
job.  Others, however, like Sanquist, et al. and Patterson, 
et al. have begun to take an intensely contextual look at 
the nature of and variety of problems facing this type of 
knowledge worker.33 34 In the view of this author, this 
approach, augmented with the work, research results, and 
techniques from the other sub-literatures discussed herein 
                     
32 Heuer, Richards J., Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 1st 
ed. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study 
of Intelligence, 1999), x-xi. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-
the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf 
(accessed January 3, 2008). 
33 Thomas F. Sanquist and others, "Cognitive Tasks in Intelligence 
Analysis: Use of Event Dwell Time to Characterize Component Activities" 
(New Orleans, LA, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 48th Annual 
Meeting, September 20-24, 2004). 
34 Emily S. Patterson, David D. Woods and David Tinapple, "Using 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) to Seed Design Concepts for Intelligence 
Analysts Under Data Overload" (Santa Monica, CA, Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 45th Annual Meeting, October 8-12, 2001). 
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represent the best hope of moving towards a broad, pan-
disciplinary approach to making significant traction with 
information overload problems. 
9. Personal, Social, and Organizational Impacts 
Eppler and Mengis introduce their own literature survey 
on information overload research by explaining the concept 
of information overload and its many related terms: 
In ordinary language, the term ‘information 
overload’ is often used to convey the simple 
notion of receiving too much information.  Within 
the research community this every day use of the 
term has led to various constructs, synonyms and 
related terms as for example cognitive overload, 
sensory overload, communication overload, 
knowledge overload, or information fatigue 
syndrome.35  
One of the ways that researchers look at information 
overload is from a perspective of organizational impacts 
which involve exploration of various communication 
processes.  Eppler and Mengis enumerate the representative 
works in this area as: 
 
Topic Reference 
Meetings Allen G. Schick, Lawrence A. 
Gordon, and Susan Haka, 
“Information overload: A temporal 
approach,” Accounting Organizations 
and Society, 15: 199-220, 1990.  
  
                     
35 Martin J. Eppler and Jeanne Mengis, A Framework for Information 
Overload Research in Organizations: Insights from Organization Science, 
Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines (Lugano, 
Switzerland: Università della Svizzera Italiana, September 2003), 7. 
http://www.bul.unisi.ch/cerca/bul/pubblicazioni/com/pdf/wpca0301.pdf 





Allen G. Schick, Lawrence A. 
Gordon, and Susan Haka, 
“Information overload: A temporal 
approach,” Accounting Organizations 
and Society, 15: 199-220, 1990. 
 
The use of 
Groupware 
applications  
Ulrike Schultz and Betty
Vandenbosch, “Information Overload 
in a Groupware Environment: Now You 
See It, Now You Don't,” Journal of 
Organizational Computing and 
Electronic Commerce, 1998, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, Pages 127-148. 
Bulletin 
Board Systems 
Starr Roxanne Hiltz and Murray 
Turoff, “Structuring Computer-
Mediated Communication Systems To 
Avoid Information Overload,” 
Communications of the ACM, Volume 
28, Issue 7 (July 1985) Pages: 680 
– 689. 
Face to face 
discussions  
Paul R. Sparrow, “Strategy and 
cognition: Understanding the role 
of management knowledge structures, 
organizational memory and 
information overload,” Creativity 
and Innovation Management, 8: 140-




Rodger W. Griffeth, Kerry D. 
Carson, and Daniel B. Marin, 
“Information overload: A test of an 
inverted U hypothesis with hourly 
and salaried employees,” Academy of 




Mary-Liz Grise, and R. Brent 
Gallupe, “Information overload:
Addressing the productivity paradox 
in face-to-face electronic 
meetings,” Journal of Management 




Mary-Liz Grise, and R. Brent 
Gallupe, “Information overload:
Addressing the productivity paradox 
in face-to-face electronic 
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Topic Reference 
meetings,” Journal of Management 





David Bawden, “Information 
overload,” Library & Information 
Briefings, 92. 
C. Speier, J.S. Valacich and I. 
Vessey, “The influence of task 
interruption on individual decision 
making: An information overload 
perspective,” Decision Sciences, 
30: 337-359, 1999. 
Peter J. Denning, “Electronic 
junk,” Communications of the ACM, 
25: 163-168, 1982. 
Management 
consulting  
Morten T. Hansen and Martine R. 
Haas, “Competing for Attention in 
Knowledge Markets: Electronic 
Document Dissemination in a 
Management Consulting Company,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Nr. 46: 1-28, 2001  
City 
interactions  
Stanley Milgram, “The Experience of 
Living in the Cities,” in Science, 






David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz, 
and Louis L. Wilde, “The 
irrelevance of information 
overload: An analysis of search and 
disclosure,” Southern California 
Management Review, 59:277-303, 1986 
Table 1.  Eppler and Mengis Literature Review 
 Researchers have found the performance of individuals 
in decision-making improves with increasing amount of 
information, up to a point, after which performance actually 
suffers.  Beyond this point, at the information overload 
level, additional information is not incorporated, and it is 
difficult for the individual to prioritize and even to deal 
with and recall information encountered earlier. 
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 Eppler and Mengis and their cited references provide 
additional exploration of this topic.  Eppler and Mengis 
describe a significant factor missing in the literature, 
which is emphasized in this paper: 
As contextual factors (such as industry 
characteristics, the firm’s development stage or 
the staff structure etc.) are of crucial 
importance for the occurrence of overload, 
research methods should be applied that can 
capture many of these contextual factors and thus 
highlight interdependencies.  Research approaches 
that provide such a ‘deep context’ are missing, 
as most literature on the topic is experimental, 
survey-based, or purely conceptual.36 
The importance of context, although recognized by 
Eppler and Mengis, has not been significantly explored in 
the research. 
D. INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
Table 2 (below) identifies each of the (at least 
partially) relevant research threads from various fields 
that touch upon the information overload problem.  The Table 
identifies the areas of investigation of each research 
thread.  It is apparent that each research thread approaches 
the problem from its own unique perspective, and while there 
is certainly some overlap between some of the research 
threads, no single (or even pair) of research threads covers 
the entire breadth and depth of this problem. 
 
                     
36 Eppler and Mengis, A Framework for Information Overload Research 
in Organizations: Insights from Organization Science, Accounting, 
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Table 2.  Components of Information Overload & Related      
Disciplines 
1. Multidisciplinary Approaches 
There are few multidisciplinary approaches being taken 
in the current research threads on this topic.  The one that 
has the broadest multidisciplinary approach is the emerging 
field of Augmented Cognition. Although it does not yet 
encompass all the other research threads, one could make the 
case that because of its intrinsic focus on the user and the 
user’s cognitive processes; it stands the best chance of in 
the future of incorporating the other social, 
organizational, contextual and technological aspects of this 
problem. 
2. Augmented Cognition 
Augmented Cognition is a very new field attempting a 
fusion among several of the disciplines, specifically HCI, 
UI Design, and human cognitive and perceptual capabilities, 
but still falls short of exploiting all of the dimensions of 
context. 
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Augmented Cognition is a field that does not 
reside in just one scientific discipline — it 
draws from areas such as neuroscience, 
biopsychology, cognitive psychology, human 
factors, information technology, and computer 
science.  Each of these fields has itself 
undergone a substantial revolution over the past 
forty years that has allowed the 
problems/challenges raised by the researchers in 
this field to begin to be satisfactorily 
investigated.  Although there are many individual 
research projects that contributed to the general 
development and direction of this field, several 
multimillion dollar efforts helped shape the 
foundation on which the current augmented 
cognition field is built.37 
E. THE FUTURE 
As previously stated “circular reporting” and 
“complexity of data sources” are not new, however, little 
has been written regarding their link to specific 
information technology disciplines.  The absence of research 
on “circular reporting” and “complexity of data sources” may 
be due to the fact that circular reporting” and “complexity 
of data sources” are more prevalent in the post 9/11 
intelligence community with the emergence of fusion centers 
that have created a new set of information overload 
problems.  Research needs to be conducted exploring the 
impact of “circular reporting” and “complexity of data 
sources” on information overload and how to best mitigate 
its effects. 
                     
37 "History: Emergence of Augmented Cognition," Augmented Cognition 
International Society, http://www.augmentedcognition.org/history.htm 
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
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The research portion of this thesis will utilize a 
survey to explore the effectiveness of reducing information 
overload in terms of circular reporting and complexity of 
data sources through the development of technology using a 
context-based approach. 
The survey will measure the respondents’ beliefs and 
opinions about the use of a technology artifact built using 
a context-based approach, in particular, the respondents’ 
perceived value in the implementation of the technology 
artifact on the following issues:  information overload, 
circular reporting, and complexity of data sources.  In 
addition, the survey will measure the respondents’ views of 
the system’s usefulness and the ease with which it can be 
used, both of which are predictors of future technology 
adoption. 
The survey will follow a deductive approach by 
beginning with applied research problems and ending with 
empirical measurements and data analyses both of which will 
be expressed in Chapter IV; the findings will be discussed 
in Chapter V; and the thesis will conclude with a 
recommendations section outlined in Chapter VI. 
B. POPULATION 
The sample population will be made up of 34 criminal 
intelligence analysts.  All of the subjects are assigned to 
the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center, 
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(STIC).  The analysts are permanent employees of the 
Illinois State Police, Illinois National Guard, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
and the Department of Homeland Security.  The respondents 
have agreed to answer the statements and understand they may 
refuse to participate or to answer any particular statement. 
C. RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 
It is relevant to note that the author has been 
involved with the conceptual development of the technology 
artifact to be tested and is a Sr. Command official within 
the Illinois State Police.  In this capacity the author has 
ultimate responsibility for the oversight of the Statewide 
Terrorism and Intelligence Center and its employees.  In an 
effort to eliminate perceived interview bias and prestige 
bias, the author will be utilizing two independent research 
assistants from the Illinois State Police Research and 
Development Bureau.  These research assistants are 
experienced at administering surveys.  Neither of the 
research assistants employed is familiar with the technology 
artifact, and neither of them supervises any of the 
respondents involved in the survey.  The research assistants 
will be coached by the author on how to conduct the survey.  
The research assistants will provide the raw data to the 
author for tabulation and analysis.  The author will only 
interpret the data as provided. 
D. SURVEY 
The survey instrument will contain 30 closed 
statements.  Six statements will be used to determine the 
users’ observations in each of five areas, including ease of 
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use, usefulness, circular reporting, complexity of data 
sources, and information overload.  No open statements or 
questions will be utilized; this will be addressed later in 
this chapter within the limitations section. 
During the development of the survey, the author will 
avoid the use of any abbreviations, slang, or jargon.  The 
survey will be organized in a manner that minimizes the 
effects of both order and context.  Thus, the statements 
will be in random order so the respondent will not answer 
consecutive statements from within the same measurable area.  
Within each area, half of the statements will be stated in 
the negative and half in the affirmative to prevent a 
positive bias.  A seven point Likert scale (Strongly Agree 
to Strongly Disagree) will be used to measure variance in 
respondents’ perceptions. 
Please see Appendix C for the Survey. 
All survey items measuring a particular variable will 
be tested for Convergent validity seeking Cronbach's alpha 
reliability score of 0.70 or higher.  Many social science 
professionals, require a Cronbach's alpha reliability score 
of 0.70 or higher.38  “Cronbach's alpha is viewed as a 
measure of how well the sum score of the selected items 
capture the expected score for the larger domain, even if 
that domain is heterogeneous.” 39 
                     
38 J. Reynaldo A. Santos, “Cronbach’s Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the 
Reliability of Scales” Journal of Extension 37, no. 2 (April 1999) 
http://www.joe.org/joe/1999april/tt3.html (accessed January 9, 2008) 
39 Peter H. Hopewell, Assessing the Acceptance and Functional Value 
of the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) at the Tactical Level. (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.), 29.  
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All variables will be tested for discriminant validity 
to ensure they are moving separately and are not measuring 
the same thing. 
Although there is no standard value for 
discriminant validity, a result less than .85 
tells us that discriminant validity likely exists 
between the two scales.  A result greater than 
.85, however, tells us that the two constructs 
overlap greatly and they are likely measuring the 
same thing.  Therefore, we cannot claim 
discriminant validity between them.40  
E. PROCESS 
Prior to beginning the final survey a Trial Run will be 
performed.  The Trial Run will be performed using four 
supervisors of the criminal intelligence analysts, all of 
whom work within the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence 
Center.  All of the respondents who will be involved in the 
Trial Run will receive the same training as those who will 
be given the opportunity to participate in the final survey.  
The trial run will be conducted in order to train the team 
and refine the statements.  The trial run will establish 
that the subjects do not have difficulty following the 
directions and that the process for administering the survey 
will function as planned.  In terms of the survey 
instrument, the four respondents will complete the survey 
                     
40 “Discriminant Validity” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discriminant_validity (accessed January 9, 
2008. According to Wikipedia, this information was discerned from the 
following sources: D. T. Campbell and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and 
Discriminate Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix." 
Psychological Bulletin 56, no. 2 (1959): 81-105 and Oliver P. John and 
Veronica Benet-Martinez, "Measurement: Reliability, Construct 
Validation, and Scale Construction" In Handbook of Research Methods in 
Social and Personality Psychology, eds. Reis, Harry T. Reis and Charles 
M. Judd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 339-369. 
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and report if the statements are understandable and lack 
ambiguity.  Feedback from the initial trial run will be used 
to further develop the survey statements. 
Each of the respondents will enter a private office.  
Once in the private office, one of the research assistants 
will hand the survey directions (see Appendix B) to the 
respondent.  The respondent will be asked if he or she has 
any questions or needs further clarification prior to 
continuing with the survey.  The research assistant will 
answer the questions until the respondent is prepared to 
proceed. 
Following the completion of the survey, the respondent 
will seal the survey in an envelope.  The respondent will 
then exit the private office and enter a second private 
office.  Once in the second private office the respondent 
will be greeted by the second research assistant.  The 
second research assistant will inquire with the respondent 
if he or she understood the statements, and if he or she had 
any concerns or thoughts regarding the survey or the 
process.  Absent any significant concern, the respondent 
will place the sealed envelope in a box with a cutout in the 
top.  This process will insure the respondent that his or 
her responses will remain anonymous and confidential.  The 
surveys will not be collected from the box until all 
respondents have been given the opportunity to participate 
and have completed the process. 
F. LIMITATIONS 
There are only 34 criminal intelligence analysts who 
work within the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and 
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Intelligence Center.  Each of these analysts will be given 
the opportunity to participate in the survey.  Due to this 
fact, it will not be necessary to randomly select 
respondents.  While all of the respondents are being given 
the opportunity to participate, the fact remains that the 
survey will include a maximum number of 30.  Validity and 
reliability are both maximized by the number of respondents 
who participate.  When reviewing the findings and 
recommendations of this thesis, the number of respondents 
will be considered. 
The technology artifact being considered in the survey 
is a new initiative.  The respondents were trained on the 
use of the technology during two formal training sessions 
both of which occurred between November 24 and December 13, 
2007.  The training was taught by both intelligence 
leadership from within the Illinois State Police and the 
company responsible for the development of the technology 
being considered.  During the training each of the 
respondents completed the same training exercises and 
scenarios, thus they have a similar level of baseline 
experience.  Each of the respondents has used the technology 
artifact in the regular course of their business for a 
minimum of five work shifts.  When reviewing the findings 
and recommendations of this thesis the level of experience 
of the respondents will be considered. 
The respondents have anticipated the delivery of this 
technology artifact since April 2007.  Due to internal 
budgetary issues and internal network problems within the 
Illinois State Police, the company responsible for the 
delivery of the technology artifact was unable to install 
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the system.  This delay was a source of frustration for 
several of the respondents.  It is unclear how this 
frustration may impact the perception of the respondents; 
nonetheless, this will be considered when reviewing the 
findings. 
As previously stated within this chapter, the survey 
will consist of closed statements.  The use of only closed 
statements may limit the type of responses from the 
respondents.  The respondents will not be able to provide 
any details regarding the reason, thought process, or frame 
of reference for the answers provided.  Another limitation 
to the closed statement format is that the author will be 
unable to understand or explain unanticipated findings.  
When reviewing the findings and recommendations of this 
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IV. SURVEY FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The results of the survey completed by the respondents 
were tabulated and analyzed using SPSS 15.0.  Many of the 
items in this survey were drawn from previously validated 
instruments, specifically, the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM), studies conducted by Lin, HU and Chen41 as well as 
previous research done by Lin42, and subsequent research by 
Hopewell43.  The type of survey statements were extracted 
from these bodies of works and then altered to meet the 
demands of this particular study.  In addition to these 
instruments, the Senior Intelligence Analyst from the 
Illinois State Police and a retired Illinois State Police 
Major with extensive intelligence and information technology 
experience were called upon to validate the statements. 
This study examines the instrument’s convergent and 
discriminate validity.  Using the responses from the survey, 
the instrument’s convergent validity was examined using the 
Cronbach’s alpha value for each of the specified constructs.  
As previously stated, many social science professionals 
require a Cronbach’s alpha reliability score of 0.70 or 
                     
41 Paul Jen-Hwa Hu, Chienting Lin and Hsinchun Chen, "User Acceptance 
of Intelligence and Security Informatics Technology: A Study of 
COPLINK." Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology 56, no. 3 (2005): 235-244. 
42 Chienting Lin, "Examining Technology Usability and User Acceptance 
in Digital Government: A Case Study in Law Enforcement" (PhD, Pace 
University), 2004. 
43 Peter H. Hopewell, Assessing the Acceptance and Functional Value 
of the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) at the Tactical Level. (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.) 
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higher.44  The results of the reliability analysis are 
displayed in the tables throughout this chapter.  The 
Cronbach’s Alpha values ranged between .651 and .848.  
Although not all values met the .70 or higher preferred 
reliability score, most exceeded and those that did not were 
relatively close. 
The survey was completed by thirty intelligence 
analysts referred to throughout this chapter as respondents.  
Four of the thirty-four analysts who worked at the STIC were 
unavailable.  Each of the respondents surveyed worked at the 
Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) 
located in Springfield, Illinois.  The respondents 
represented the Illinois State Police, Illinois National 
Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Each of the respondents is well educated and 
possessed a minimum of a bachelor’s degree.  Eighteen of the 
respondents had more than 3 years of analytical experience.  
All were proficient in the used intelligence-related 
technology tools such as, the Law Enforcement Data System, 
Violent Crime Information Tracking, and Linking System, 
Chicago Area Crime Database, Regional Data Exchange, and 
numerous others. 
All thirty of the respondents agreed in writing to 
participate.  An independent research team administered the 
survey, and each respondent was assured both verbally and 
through the process that their responses would be anonymous.  
Refer to Chapter III for further details regarding the 
                     
44 J. Reynaldo A. Santos, “Cronbach’s Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the 
Reliability of Scales” Journal of Extension 37, no. 2 (April 1999) 
http://www.joe.org/joe/1999april/tt3.html (accessed January 9, 2008) 
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methodology process utilized.  It should be noted that three 
of the thirty responses were not considered due to being 
incomplete or non-responsive. 
This chapter presents a detailed examination of five 
hypotheses: 
1. Information overload exists within the STIC. 
2. Circular reporting is occurring. 
3. Complexity of data sources has a negative effect 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
analysts within STIC. 
4. A context-based technology product has reduced 
circular reporting. 
5. A context-based technology product within the STIC 
has assisted with the management of complex data 
sources. 
The survey instrument used a seven point Likert scale, 
where a neutral mean value (e.g., 4) was neither strong nor 
weak.  For purposes of analysis, ten negatively worded 
statements were used to test for a positive bias in the 
survey responses.  Due to the need to aggregate both the 
negatively and positively worded statements, an adjusted 
mean had to be utilized.  This adjusted mean takes into 
account the fact that the responses to the negatively coded 
statements were inverted.  Accordingly, a positively coded 
statement used the following Likert scale (1=Strongly Agree, 
2=Agree, 3=Somewhat Agree, 4=Undecided, 5=Somewhat Disagree, 
6=Disagree, 7=Strongly Disagree) and the negatively coded 
statements used the following Likert scale (1=Strongly 
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Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Somewhat Disagree, 4=Undecided, 
5=Somewhat Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree).  
 In each of the tables below, the survey statements 
with an adjusted mean value (1.0-3.9) shows positive 
attributes, whereas an adjusted mean value (4.1-7.0) shows 
negative attributes.  As in the Hopewell research, “multiple 
questions were used to measure single variables, allowing 
for variation in how individuals respond to varying word 
structures.”45 
As the title of this thesis indicates, the author 
attempted to answer the issue:  Does the impact of a 
“context-based approach” to the design of tools for 
intelligence analysts mitigate information overload?  
Furthermore, the paper was founded on the premise that 
information overload is negatively affected by both circular 
reporting and the complexity of data sources.  In an effort 
to substantiate this theory, the survey was designed to 
capture the self-reported perception of the respondents 
regarding the effect of the context-based approach to the 
development of technology on each of these areas.  
B. INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
The issue of information overload was examined in two 
distinct ways: 1) do the respondents perceive that 
information overload exists within the STIC; 2) what affect 
do respondents perceive the context-based technology 
artifact has on the information overload issue? 
                     
45 Peter H. Hopewell, Assessing the Acceptance and Functional Value 
of the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) at the Tactical Level (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 27. 
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1. Is there a perception that Information Overload  
  exists within the STIC? 
Two statements were included in the survey about the 











8 Amount of information 
available to me is 
difficult to handle. 
3.96 1.87 
26 Amount of information I 
am expected to review 
makes it difficult for me 
to complete strategic 
analysis. 
2.93 1.51 
Table 3.  Survey Statements Regarding Information Overload within 
STIC 
These two statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together, the results are found below. 
 
Statements 
Adjusted Mean of 
the Index for 
Information 





8 & 26 3.4 .747 1-6.5 1.52 
Table 4.  Index for Information Overload at STIC 
Upon close examination of the standard deviation and 
range data one finds that the respondents did not agree that 
information overload existed within the STIC.  This 
disagreement led to an index mean of 3.4.  This score has a 
tendency to reflect that there was a preponderance of 
support indicating that the respondents leaned toward the 
belief that information overload existed. 
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2. Perception of the affect that the context-based  
  technology approach will have on information  
  overload within the STIC? 
Four statements were included in the survey regarding 
the respondents’ perception regarding the affect that the 
context-based technology approach had on information 
overload at STIC. 
Statement 





3 Context-based technology 
approach will increase the 
time I spend collating 
information. 
2.55 1.15 
4 The context-based technology 
approach will improve my 
ability to handle 
information. 
2.25 .944 
11 Use of a context-based 
technology approach will 
decrease the time I spend 
collating information. 
2.77 1.08 
28 Use of a context-based 
technology approach will 
reduce the time I spend 
collecting information. 
2.44 .974 
Table 5.  Survey Statements Regarding Context-Based          
Technology Effect on Information Overload 
These four statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together, the results are found below. 
Statements 
Adjusted Mean of the 









3,4,11,28 2.50 .737 .779 
Table 6.  Index for Effect of Context-Based Approach on     
Information Overload at STIC 
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In looking at the data there appears to be strong 
agreement that the context-based technology product analyzed 
in this study had a positive impact on the information 
overload at the STIC.  This is an important finding.  If we 
couple this with the findings discussed above regarding the 
perceived level of information overload at the STIC, one can 
reason that the context-based product studied has reduced 
current information overload and may be beneficial in the 
future as additional data sources are made available to the 
respondents.  Regardless of the perceived current level of 
information overload, it is clear the respondents feel the 
product examined has allowed them to handle information more 
effectively and more efficiently. 
C. CIRCULAR REPORTING 
The issue of circular reporting was examined in two 
distinct ways.  First, did the respondents perceive that 
circular reporting exists?  Second, what affect did the 
respondents perceive the context-based technology artifact 
had on the circular reporting issue? 
1. Is there a perception that circular reporting  
  exists? 
Three statements were included in the survey regarding 
the perception of the respondents regarding circular 












10 Productivity is negatively 
impacted by the amount of 
times I read duplicate 
material. 
2.70 1.29 
17 Seldom am I expected to read 
duplicate information. 
2.51 1.08 
22 Frequently I am expected to 
read duplicate information. 
2.70 1.23 
Table 7.  Survey Statements Regarding Circular Reporting         
Within STIC 
These three statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together, the results are found below. 
 
Statements 
Mean of the Index for 






10,17,22 2.64 .669 .937 
Table 8.  Index for Circular Reporting at STIC 
A review of the data indicates there is agreement that 
circular reporting existed (e.g., 2.64).  A review of this 
data shows a few respondents who disagreed with this 
premise. 
2. Perception of the affect that the context-based  
  technology approach will have on circular   
  reporting? 
Four statements were included in the survey regarding 
the respondents’ perception about the affect that the 











6 Context-based technology 
will increase the number of 
times I read duplicate 
information. 
3.37 1.49 
23 Use of a context-based 
technology approach will 
reduce the number of times I 
am required to read 
duplicate information. 
2.96 1.19 
Table 9.  Survey Statements Regarding Context-Based Technology   
Effect on Circular Reporting within STIC 
These two statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together, the results are found below. 
 
Statements 
Adjusted Mean of the 
Index for the Effect 
of a Context-Based 






6 & 23 3.16 .695 1.18 
Table 10.   Index for Effect of Context-Based Approach            
on Circular Reporting within STIC 
In reviewing the findings of this particular construct 
it was clear the respondents believed there were positive 
attributes to how the context-based product that was 
examined effected circular reporting. 
D. COMPLEX DATA SOURCES 
The issue of complex data sources was examined in two 
distinct ways.  First, did the respondents perceive that the 
issue of complex data sources was problematic within the 
STIC?  Secondly, what affect did the respondents perceive 
the context-based technology artifact had on the complex 
data sources issue? 
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1. Is there a perception that complex data sources  
  cause a negative impact within the STIC? 
Two statements were included in the survey regarding 
the perception of the respondents regarding complex data 
sources at STIC. 
 
Statement 





15 The number of data sources 
I am required to check 
makes it difficult for me 
to provide a timely 
response. 
2.92 1.41 
30 Number of data sources 
available to me is easy to 
manage. 
3.70 1.48 
Table 11.   Survey Statements Regarding Complex Data         
Sources within STIC 
These two statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together, the results are found below. 
 
Statements 
Adjusted Mean of the 
Index for the Issue of 






15 & 30 3.31 .651 1.24 
Table 12.   Index for Complex Data Sources at STIC 
A review of the data shows disagreement amongst the 
respondents.  Although, most believed that the data sources 
available within STIC had a negative impact, others believed 
that the sources available were manageable.  The index mean 
of 3.31 indicates there is moderate concern regarding this 
facet of information overload. 
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2. Perception of the affect that the context-based  
  technology approach will have on complex data  
  sources within the STIC? 
Three statements were included in the survey regarding 
the respondents’ perception regarding the affect that the 
context-based technology approach had on complex data 
sources at STIC. 
 
Statement 





7 Context-based technology 
approach will make it more 
difficult to handle the 
number of data sources 
available to me. 
2.33 1.10 
16 The context-based technology 
approach will make it easier 
to handle the number of data 
sources available to me. 
2.25 .784 
21 It would be beneficial to me 
if more data sources were 
accessible through a 
context-based technology 
approach.   
1.62 .966 
Table 13.   Survey Statements Regarding Context-Based       
Approach on Complex Data Sources 
These three statements were combined into one index and 
analyzed together.  The results are found below. 
 
Statements 
Adjusted Mean of the 
Index for the Effect 
of Context-Based 
Technology on Handling 





7,16,21 2.09 .700 .761 
Table 14.   Index for Effect of Context-Based Approach            
on Complex Data Sources within STIC 
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The fact that the respondents strongly (mean of 2.09) 
believed that the context-based technology product had a 
positive impact on how they handle complex data sources is 
an important finding. 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Several key findings are noted in the analysis outlined 
above.  Below is a summary of those critical observations. 
1. A comparison of the indexes involving the current 
perceived situation at the STIC reflects that the 
respondents believed circular reporting was the most 
significant concern (mean of 2.64), followed by 
complex data sources (mean of 3.31).  Finally, the 
respondents viewed information overload is the least 
concern of the three areas studied (mean of 3.4). 
2. Of interest is the finding that both circular 
reporting and complex data sources were viewed to be 
of greater concern than the issue of information 
overload.  This finding begs the question, how could 
the respondents view both circular reporting and 
complex data sources to be of more significant 
concern than the more general, overarching issue of 
information overload? 
3. In each of the areas examined, information overload, 
circular reporting, and complex data sources, the 
respondents believed the context-based system 
examined can improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the current state of being. 
4. The respondents reported that the context-based 
product had the greatest impact on the handling of 
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complex data sources (mean of 2.09), followed by the 
ability to minimize information overload (mean of 
2.5).  Although the respondents believed the system 
had a positive impact on circular reporting (mean 
3.4), they believed the impact would not be as great 
as that of the other two constructs. 
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V. RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As new concepts have been conceived, engineered, and 
executed throughout history, so too has the conventional 
wisdom to seek out specialists who can assist in the pursuit 
of constructing the conceptualizations of these idea 
generators, or architects.  The ability to tap into 
specialized knowledge provides for on-demand, content-
specific expertise to be applied to the corresponding issue 
or problem.  This “specialist” generally seeks to understand 
the circumstances of the assigned task, formulate a plan 
based upon his or her assessment and pre-existing knowledge, 
make predictions about how to affect or move the task to the 
desired state, put those plans into action, proactively 
monitor the affects from the action and the overall solution 
- making adjustments as necessary and repeating the process 
until a final, hopefully successful, state is reached. 
With the perspective that “context” is core to deeper 
understanding of issues, the Illinois State Police in 2005 
entered into an agreement with RiverGlass, Inc. to develop a 
context-based technology solution.  The system was designed 
in association with intelligence analysts at the Illinois 
Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC).  What 
separated this system from others was the fact that it was 
designed to operate akin to an intelligence analyst; 
fundamentally the context of how the end user would operate 
using this system was the driving principle throughout the 
project lifecycle.  Accordingly, the system was built to 
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intuitively operate and process information comparably to 
independent, intelligence analysts. 
Throughout the development of this context-based 
technology, numerous municipal, state, and Federal law 
enforcement, intelligence, and military entities contacted 
the Illinois State Police to gain an understanding of the 
scope of this endeavor.  Inevitably questions were raised, 
for instance:  1) Does the context-based approach reduce 
information overload?  2) Does the context-based approach 
reduce circular reporting?  3) Can the context-based 
approach combine both structured and unstructured data from 
a variety of sources and types, and thus, reduce the 
complexity of data sources?  At the time, due to the stage 
of development of this technology the Illinois State Police 
discovered it was not possible to definitively answer any of 
these questions; that deficiency prompted this research. 
The research in this thesis has established that the 
existence of information overload, circular reporting, and 
the complexity of data sources negatively impacts the 
performance of intelligence analysts who work within fusion 
centers.  Furthermore, the research has established that 
intelligence analysts perceive the use of a context-based 
technology solution will improve their efficiency and 
effectiveness as well as the overall operation of the STIC. 
Based on these findings, several specific 
recommendations have emerged; these recommendations are 
found below.  In addition, gaps in the literature are 
recognized.  Unanswered questions stemming from this 
research have also materialized and will be introduced. 
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It is clear that in advance of making specific 
recommendations, they should be aimed at accomplishing the 
following goals. 
1. Circular Reporting 
• Identify key strategies for reducing the 
production of circular reports. 
• Identify mechanisms for detecting and dealing 
with duplicate input as early as possible in 
fusion center operations. 
2. Complexity of Data Sources 
• Minimize the complexity of accessing and 
utilizing multiple data sources. 
• Maximize the utility of all known information 
in fulfilling the mission of the intelligence 
community. 
• Reduce the time it takes for analysis and 
simultaneously increase the comprehensiveness 
of the analysis output. 
• Enable and promote both inter- and intra-




Research Observation:  Information overload issues are 
both real and inevitable.  A fundamental question is, “What 
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are the plans for dealing with an information dense 
environment wherein the data continues to grow 
exponentially?”  It is clear that the intelligence 
community, e.g., fusion centers, cannot solve this issue by 
simply hiring additional intelligence analysts.  Leaders of 
these agencies must recognize and support the fact that a 
new solution is required. 
As technology grew, culminating in the “dot-com” boom 
of 2000, most agencies’ information technology (IT) 
departments developed an over-inflated perception of their 
role.  This manifested itself in IT specialists taking on 
too much authority in directing key strategic projects for 
which they were ill-equipped to thoroughly comprehend, much 
less lead.  Business partners acquiesced to IT specialists’ 
recommendations, as they did not understand technology well 
enough to build, manage, or deploy a technology product. 
 Gradually, IT’s business partners came to the realization 
that IT is a support function or tool, just as human 
resources and administrative functions are, not a profit 
center.  Albeit, IT is integral to business solutions but it 
should not have control of the strategic direction.  Its 
role is one of enabler, delivering technology solutions that 
are more effective and efficient, in accordance and in 
partnership with their business partners.  Unfortunately, 
leagues of mid- to senior-level managers running IT 
departments have not embraced this approach to strategy 
development. 
Recommendation:  Strong leadership must emerge from 
both business partners and IT specialists in order to solve 
the challenges of circular reporting and complexity of data 
sources.  Both must re-engineer their approach to resolving 
technology problems.  As “end users” identify deficiencies 
that require a technology solution, IT specialists must 
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partner with them by leveraging their expertise.  The IT 
professional must draw out of the end user the scope of the 
deficiency, compliment that with their understanding of the 
domain, and facilitate the development and implementation of 
“context-based” technology tools. 
At the same time, technology companies need to invest 
resources on the front end of the issue to develop a deep 
understanding of the problem space.  It is through this 
level of understanding that rich solutions will be 
developed, produced, and implemented. 
2. Circular Reporting 
a. Awareness and Focus 
Research Observation:  Today’s intelligence 
environment is a distributed network comprised of 
autonomous, loosely coupled nodes, each node being a 
Federal, state, or municipal intelligence/fusion/operations 
center.  This environment, in conjunction with information 
sharing imperatives, complicates the issue of circular 
reporting.  The network nodes have different missions, 
operate differently, and have different sources of 
information; yet they are increasingly expected to share 
information with each other.  While this lends itself to an 
information dense environment, the likelihood of duplicity 
and redundancy is all too probable.  The issue is compounded 
by the presumption that this intelligence environment works 
with a high degree and mixture of collaborative 
interdependence and autonomy.  It is with this increased 
awareness that a solution should be advanced. 
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Recommendation:  Establish within each fusion 
center a work team focused on circular reporting.  This team 
should develop procedures and guidelines aimed at reducing 
circular reporting. 
b. Best Practices 
Research Observation: The problem of circular 
reporting and management of redundant information persists 
in many domains.  Two are relevant to fusion centers -- 
patent processing and education. 
The job of the patent office is to take every new 
submission and ensure that: a) it does not infringe on 
another patent (e.g., it is not duplicative), and b) it is 
new and novel enough to receive patent protection.  This 
implies a new submission is compared to all existing patents 
at an early stage.  It further implies a fairly deep 
understanding of the content of the submission in order to 
assess the novelty of the idea.  The key ideas here are that 
the patent office has a formal structured process for 
receiving submissions (e.g., intake) and a separate 
analytical step wherein the content of the submission is 
compared to pre-existing knowledge bases.  In some ways the 
patent office is analogous to any single node in the law 
enforcement information-sharing network. 
The educational domain also has a mechanism of 
minimizing duplicate information reporting.  In fact, this 
thesis makes diligent use of it - the bibliographic 
reference.  The bibliography references the sources utilized 
in the creation of new knowledge or information.  This 
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social protocol is widely adopted and utilized in the 
production of most formal documents. 
Lastly, another process exists within the fusion 
center environment which focuses less on technology and more 
on human intervention.  This best practice is known as the 
Threat Identification Group (TIG).  The real function of the 
TIG is to synthesize information across individuals and 
specialties on a daily basis.  It is during these daily 
meetings that the complexity of cross-domain tasks, time 
constraints, and unknowns are surfaced in order to make 
decisions and set tactical direction based on the totality 
of what is known, and as important, what is needed, e.g., 
human intuition, and the best most likely path toward the 
desired outcome at that time.  It is through this type of 
human interaction that real “dots” can be identified, 
understood, supplemented, and ultimately connected; which is 
what humans excel at. 
The role of technology is to serve as an 
“electronic staff officer” for the analyst, for instance, 
knowing what sources and content are available, knowing who 
and how to contact resources (content and human), 
understanding the intent of the analyst as he\she “works 
his\her way” toward a conclusion, knowing the techniques and 
processes that are most likely to bring success. 
Recommendation:  Investigate successful models 
that are already addressing the broad issue of information 
overload and the specifics of circular reporting and 
complexity related to data sources. 
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c. Structure and Operations 
Research Observation:  Most fusion centers today 
operate either implicitly or explicitly on a model of 
gathering as much input as possible, performing analysis on 
the obtained information, and then sharing the analytical 
findings with other entities.  This Intake > Analyze > 
Disseminate model is conducive to both understanding and 
combating circular reporting.  The illustration below 
depicts this structure. 
 









Intake Techniques applied to prevent duplicate 
information caused by circular reporting 
from external entities from entering the 
fusion center.  It is the first point in 
the model where detection of circular 
reporting is possible. 
Analyze Dealing with redundant information 
contained within information sources. 
This thesis elaborated on the application 
of context-based technology in this area. 
Disseminate Analytical and informational output is 
shared with other fusion center partners. 
It is the point in the model that focuses 
on preventing the creation of circular and 
redundant information. 
Table 15.   Intake, Analyze, Disseminate Descriptions  
Recommendation:  Explore and validate the 
relevancy of an intake, analyze, and disseminate model with 
other fusion centers.  By engaging other centers and perhaps 
partnering with them, further advance the concept of a 
similar operational models that enable the sharing of 
information.  More specifically, the “Intake” module applies 
techniques to prevent duplicate information caused by 
circular reporting from entering the intelligence center at 
all.  The “Analyze” module utilizes a variety of analytical 
techniques and practices to comprehend and “make sense” out 
of the situation at hand for the purpose of making decisions 
and taking action.  The “Disseminate” module ensures that 
information is shared with only those partners whom were 




d. Survey of Technologies 
Research Observation:  The problems associated 
with circular reporting seem to advance once a document 
arrives at its intended destination.  It should be possible 
to inspect inbound items and determine if the content is new 
and relevant or redundant and irrelevant.  While the process 
is not a simple mechanical one, in that it contains the 
complexity and ambiguity of language, it is also not beyond 
the reach of our current technology aids.  This is not to 
say that technology could or should make decisions 
autonomously about the validity of an intake submission, but 
that it could aid and guide the human operator in making the 
determination.  A brief review of techniques for identifying 
duplicate, or similar documents, vary greatly in approach 
and sophistication.  Other domains, such as duplication from 
the archival industry, have emerged over the past several 
years that may hold promise.  Likewise, techniques including 
semantic and cluster analysis have also evolved. 
Recommendation:  A more formal survey of duplicate 
detection as it relates to circular reporting in the 
intelligence and fusion center business should be 
undertaken.  Finding a technology that would include 
artificial intelligence and learning algorithms that 
semantically analyzes the concepts of the document and 
possibly categorizes some into a domain taxonomy or ontology 
would be of great value.  The ideal situation would be to 
mix and match these technologies, outfit the resulting tool 
with a user interface specifically designed for the intake 
function of a fusion center, and embed it in the work 
environment of the person performing the intake. 
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e. Feedback Procedures 
Research Observation:  The impetus to share 
information in today’s intelligence communities without 
clear guidance, policies, and shared strategies, while 
having had some success, has really only exacerbated the 
circular reporting issue.  More duplicate and redundant 
information than ever has to be sifted through.  This 
information is usually generated by another fusion center.  
The overhead and resources required to deal with the inflow 
leaves little time to focus on techniques and procedures for 
reducing the onslaught. 
Recommendation:  Establish a shared procedure for 
communication to the originator upon receipt of redundant 
information.  For example, if fusion center A and B both 
receive information from DHS and fusion center B also 
redistributes to fusion center A, then fusion center A 
should have both a means and a responsibility to communicate 
to fusion center B feedback about the redundant information. 
f. Dissemination Authority 
Research Observation:  The decision made to 
disseminate information is typically made by humans.  One of 
the problems in fusion center operations is the lack of a 
known, named person, or role responsible for the publishing 
of information products by the center.  In the worst cases, 
dissemination is left up to each analyst.  In other public 
safety domains there exists a role responsible for 
coordinating and collaborating with external entities (e.g., 
Public Information Officer (PIO), corporate liaisons, etc.).  
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This construct is worthy of investigation to advance its 
feasibility and applicability to reducing the production of 
circular reporting. 
Recommendation:  Investigate the merits of 
creating a PIO equivalent within each fusion center that is 
responsible for disseminating information that originates 
from that fusion center.  The list of PIOs should be made 
available to all participants within the information-sharing 
network.  Should the concept have potential, a pilot with 
specific, scientific measurements of the affects of same 
should be considered. 
3. Complexity of Data Sources 
a. Technology 
Research Observation: State and local governments, 
typical law enforcement agencies, as well as their internal 
IT service providers who are usually responsible for 
technology initiatives (such as the topic of this thesis) 
are nearly always hamstrung by poor financing, antiquated 
technology/equipment, over-promised (and over-sold) product 
capabilities, and most importantly, ill-defined 
requirements.  The result is a diluted definition of 
success.  Fundamentally, these trends must change; first, by 
taking an anthropological approach wherein the way people in 
a fusion center actually work is studied, understood, and 
respected, and ultimately, ensuring this knowledge is 
tightly aligned with and supportive of the overall mission 
of the organization.  This type of contextual solution 
requires a blended team of experts and executive level 
support. 
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Understanding the way people work requires first 
an understanding of the word, “work.”  The work of an 
organization is the aggregate outcome of all tasks 
undertaken by the organization.  The human capital (people) 
of an organization execute units of work on a task basis, 
possibly utilizing technology to enable the processes.  
Understanding the way people work amounts to a study of 
tasks, task performance, and task outcome.  In other words, 
people are at the center of the equation. 
All too often, consultants converge on a fusion 
center at the beginning of a new project usually to install 
and configure their company’s solution.  These consultants 
have little appreciation for law enforcement or the 
intelligence business and are almost exclusively focused on 
installing “their” product which then places the burden back 
on the client to ensure the product is effectively applied 
to their work challenge and the project is properly executed 
in fulfilling the organization’s mission.  Inevitably, money 
is wasted, and equally important, missions go unfulfilled. 
Recommendation #1 – Understanding and Respecting 
the Way People Work:  A different way of approaching this 
type of problem is required; in essence, a solution based 
upon the context of what a fusion center analyst does.  It 
is recommended that a context-based technology solution 
specializing in assisting humans execute fusion center tasks 
be researched and developed. 
The author studied one such potential resolution, 
however, is not about to propose there is only one solution.  
This recommendation only suggests that technology be 
exploited to address the issue of information overload, 
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complexity of data sources and circular reporting.  
Technology works 24/7, 365 days a year, assisting each 
analyst with each task.  Technology is never fatigued or 
stressed, it is aware of all available data sources, it is 
void of any bias, it never gets distracted, and it is 
unbound in its ability to remember.  This technology 
solution should assist by continuously monitoring the 
respective situations and real world state related to the 
assigned task; it should assist by suggesting plans and 
steps based upon a pre-determined representation of Standard 
Operating Procedures, best practices, or “plays;” it should 
assist by auto-executing queries to needed information or 
notifications to other entities under certain conditions; it 
should assist by understanding the task context, the intent 
of the human analysts, the available resources (data and 
people), and should coordinate these based upon pre-
determined best practices embedded within the technology. 
This type of technology would allow the analyst to 
focus on what humans do best, i.e., adapt, learn, recognize 
patterns, perceive, and use their own intuition, without 
being overloaded by gathering and understanding the inputs 
that drive these unique human capabilities and qualities.  
In other words the technology is meant to help the human 
analysts “make-sense” out of a very specific task and the 
situation surrounding it, the context, so that the analyst 
can decide what and how to proceed to a successful outcome. 
Recommendation #2 – Survey of Technologies:  As 
stated in the main thesis, information overload is not a 
single problem; as such, it will probably not be resolved 
with a single solution.  Rather the solution is likely to 
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come from synthesizing multiple components into a single 
operational system, maximizing the aspects of each in 
getting relevant information that is organized and conducive 
to the current task, and into the hands of the analysts 
performing the task.  It is recommended a thorough 
assessment of current products, vendors, and research be 
conducted to identify viable candidates for assembling a 
context-based technology solution for fusion centers. 
Recommendation #3 – Operational Platform:  Given 
the emphasis of this recommendation on integrating context-
based technology into the heart of the analysts’ work 
environment, the capability of the work environment to be 
integrated with it cannot be overlooked.  The ideal work 
environment would be flexible enough to operate in centers 
with different missions, open enough to inter-operate with a 
variety of technology and analytic products, and be 
customized to the end users’, fusion center analysts needs.  
Like the other items in this list, this item alone will not 
impact the information overload dilemma.  Only when this and 
other recommendations are implemented will these solutions 
enable making real headway on information overload, 
specifically the issue of complex data sources. 
b. Standard Operating Procedures and Training 
Research Observation: Before attempting to apply 
technology or automation to a problem there must exist an 
understanding of how to solve the problem manually.  
Ideally, the manual solution will be reliable and repeatable 
by the human resources executing the procedure.  In the 
fusion center business Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
are known steps for given request types that are necessary 
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for policy compliance, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
Ideally these procedures embody all actions and techniques 
that have worked in the past, ensure unsuccessful techniques 
are not repeated, are continually updated and refined, and 
are known and followed by all center staff. 
SOPs exist at multiple levels.  At the most 
granular level of detail for frequently occurring, 
prescriptive fusion center tasks, such as, patrol stop 
workups, investigative requests, toll analysis, de-
confliction, etc. could and should be documented as SOPs.  
At a more general level, when the task is not prescriptive, 
SOPs could guide analysts to the correct data sources 
respecting the circumstances of the task. 
Unfortunately, the rapid growth of fusion centers, 
the increasing complexity of data sources, time drains of 
circular reporting, a shortage of qualified analytical staff 
and an increasing workload have resulted in most center’s 
procedures being ad-hoc, incomplete, inconsistent, and 
driven by individual analysts’ capabilities, knowledge, and 
training. 
Recommendation:  An adaptable, automated, 
knowledge-driven, best practice and standard operating 
procedures technology must be developed and accessible to 
the analysts.  It is through these automated standard 
operating procedures that technology will help drive the 
work of the analysts.  Doing so will minimize the complexity 
of which data sources should or should not be utilized. 
Coupling this feature with automated federated access to 
data sources will further reduce the negative effects caused 
by the complexity of data sources.  When analysts are able 
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to make a single query, and then with the assistance of 
enabling technology, the “system” extracts relevant 
information from a variety of data sources, the business of 
the reduction in complexity of data sources will begin. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The phrase “Information Overload” is becoming 
commonplace.  Many are beginning to write about this growing 
phenomenon.  What is absent in the literature is a focus on 
a multi-disciplinary approach with an intrinsic focal point 
on the end user and their cognitive processes while 
incorporating the social, organizational, contextual, and 
technological aspects of this important issue. 
Similarly, the issues of circular reporting and 
complexity of data sources has not been thoroughly 
researched.  Noticeably absent from the literature is the 
causal relationship that exists between circular reporting, 
complexity of data sources, and information overload.  It is 
certain both circular reporting and the complexity of data 
sources will continue to plague the performance of 
intelligence units throughout the world.  The number of 
nodes in the network amplifies the problem as well.  As 
fusion centers and intelligence shops continue to be funded 
and thereby increase in number, it only stands to reason 
that the prevalence of circular reporting will only be 
further exacerbated. 
Secondly, more data is being collected than in the 




addition, those data sources are going to become more 
prevalent and be available through more disparate mediums 
than ever before. 
If left unaddressed, it is clear circular reporting and 
complexity of data sources are going to continue to diminish 
the capacity of fusion centers.  These issues must be 
researched, understood and solutions developed in order to 
minimize their debilitating effects on the security of our 
communities and nation. 
Finally, although not addressed in this thesis, a key 
component to the value of any technology is how easy it is 
for the user to use the technology and how useful they feel 
the system will be.  If a solution is not easy to use or is 
not perceived to be useful, it will be underutilized; 
therefore, it is imperative these two factors are also 
subjects of future consideration.  Although the findings are 
clear that the context-based technology researched will 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of fusion centers, 
the research did not address the impressions of the analysts 
regarding ease of use and usefulness; thus, we cannot be 
certain about the degree of use for the system. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The utilization of a context-based technology, tailored 
specifically to the needs and mission of the intelligence 
analysts within fusion centers, will greatly reduce 
information overload by aiding the analyst in understanding 
and approaching each task based on the context of that 
particular task and that analyst. 
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Embedding the context of both the task and the analyst 
into new technology will directly impact the business 
processes and operating environment of a fusion center.  
This will also reduce the information overload inherent in 
the increasingly complex data and information sources.  
Overall, the effectiveness and efficiency of the fusion 
center will be dramatically improved.  These improvements 
will come by: 
• Aiding analysts in deciding when and how to access 
and utilize the multitude of information sources 
available to a fusion center. 
• Providing for more efficient, comprehensive and 
consistent task performance and task outcome by 
having the context-based technology assist and 
guide the human analyst. 
• Reducing the initial training time for analysts to 
become productive, and providing continual 
training as the knowledge driving the decision 
support system is updated. 
The security of our nation and even smaller communities 
rests on the ability of public servants to access, 
comprehend, and address the data available to them.  It is 
imperative we understand the challenges these servants face 
and then develop and execute viable strategies that 
facilitate overcoming the daunting challenges they face in 
an environment where this explosion of information overload 
is only expected to become more demanding and further 
exacerbated by circular reporting and the complexity of data 
sources. 
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APPENDIX A - SURVEY MAPPING  
 
Perceived usefulness: 
1. Using a context-based technology product in my job would 
enable me to accomplish tasks more quickly. 
2. Using a context-based technology product will decrease my 
job performance. 
3. Using a context-based technology product will increase my 
productivity. 
4. Using a context-based technology product will decrease my 
effectiveness on the job. 
5. Using a context-based technology product will make it more 
difficult to do my job. 
6. I will find a context-based technology product useful in my 
job. 
Perceived ease of use: 
1. Learning to utilize a context-based technology would be easy 
for me. 
2. I have found it easy to use a context-based technology to 
obtain decision-making material. 
3. Using a context-based technology is complicated. 
4. I have found a context-based technology to be inflexible to 
interact with. 
5. It would be easy for me to become skilled at using a 
context-based technology. 
6. I have found the context-based technology product difficult 
to use. 
Perceived effect on Information Overload: 
1. The use of a context-based technology will reduce the time I 
spend collecting information. 
2. The use of a context-based technology will increase the time 
I spend collating information. 
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3. The use of a context-based technology will decrease the time 
I spend collating information. 
4. The use of a context-based technology will improve my 
ability to handle the information available to me. 
5. The amount of information I am expected to review makes it 
difficult for me to complete strategic analysis. 
6. The amount of information available to me is difficult to 
handle.  
Perceived effect on Complexity of Data Sources:  
1. It is difficult to access the data sources available to me. 
2. The number of data sources I am required to check makes it 
difficult for me to provide a timely response. 
3. The number of data sources available to me is easy to 
manage. 
4. It would be beneficial to me if more data sources were 
accessible through a context-based technology.  
5. Using a context-based technology will make it more difficult 
to handle the number of data sources available to me. 
6. Using a context-based technology will make it easier to 
handle the number of data sources available to me.   
Perceived effect on Circular Reporting: 
1. The use of a context-based technology will reduce the number 
of times I am required to read duplicate information. 
2. The use of a context-based technology will increase the 
number of times I am required to read duplicate information. 
3. Frequently I am expected to read duplicate information. 
4. Seldom am I expected to read duplicate information. 
5. My productivity is negatively impacted by the amount of 
times I am expected to read duplicate material. 
6. There are occasions when I put together an intelligence 
product and later see it being reported back to me. 
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APPENDIX B - SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS 
Your participation in the survey is completely 
voluntary. 
The following outlines the process for completing the 
survey.  These steps have been put into place to assure you 
that your responses will remain anonymous. 
All criminal intelligence analysts who are assigned to 
the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center, regardless 
of your parent agency, will be given the opportunity to 
participate.  If you choose not to participate, that 
decision will not be made known to the research assistants, 
the graduate student or your parent agency. 
At the beginning of the survey you will be asked to 
identify whether you have less than three years of 
experience as an intelligence analyst or if you have more 
than three years of experience as an intelligence analyst.  
Based on what we know about the potential respondents, we 
believe half have less than three years of experience and 
half have more than three years of experience. 
If you choose to participate you will read 30 
statements, you are asked to circle the answer which most 
closely represents your perceptions of the statement.  
Possible responses will vary between Strongly Agree and 
Strongly Disagree. 
You will be greeted by a research assistant and asked 
to complete the survey in a private office.  Once finished 
you will leave that office and enter a second private 
office.  You will be greeted by a second research assistant.  
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At the time the second research assistant will ask you if 
you have any questions or if any of the statements were not 
understood.  Once you are comfortable with the responses you 
will place the survey in an envelope, seal the envelope, and 
place it in a sealed box. 
The sealed box with the completed surveys will not be 
opened until all 34 respondents have had the opportunity to 
complete the survey and place it in the sealed box. 
If you elect not to participate, you will go through 
the same process.  This will keep the research assistants 
from knowing who participated and who did not. 
There are no statements on the survey that contain 
information that can be traced to any individual. 
A graduate student prepared the attached survey.  The 
information obtained from the survey will be compiled and 
included in the students’ graduate work.  In addition to the 
completed work being publicly accessible, it will also be 
distributed directly to the following entities: 
Department of Homeland Security 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Illinois National Guard 
Illinois State Police 
Illinois Terrorism Task Force 
Naval Postgraduate School 
RiverGlass, Inc. 
Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
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We thank you for your participation. 
I have read the instructions above and I fully 
understand that my participation is completely voluntary.  I 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 95
APPENDIX C - SURVEY 
Throughout the attached survey you will find the term 
context-based technology.  In an effort to insure all of the 
respondents fully understand the author’s use of this term; 
the following paragraph is used to describe the intended 
meaning. 
Most attempts to solve the information overload problem 
have neglected the most critical pieces of any solution: the 
people, the nature of their work, their goals, their roles, 
their organizations, their experience, and finally their 
training; in other words, the “context” of the user.  In a 
highly technical field this is not unusual.  Technology 
developed around a context-based approach inverts the usual 
methodology.  Instead of starting with the technology, and 
naively believing all problems will be solved if everyone 
could retrieve and share information with others, the 
context-based approach starts with the user and the user’s 
tasks, roles, and goals.46  The contextual approach then 
dictates what type of analytics and visualizations need to 
be brought to bear to create an effective solution to a 
particular problem.  
Within the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center, 
a new system has recently been introduced, RiverGlass.  
 
 
                     
46  Keith Järvelin, Peter Ingerwesen and Nick Belkin, "Information 
Retrieval in Contexts" (SIGIR 2004 IRiX Workshop, Sheffield, England, 
July 29, 2004). 
http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/context/IRinContext_WorkshopNotes_SIGIR2004.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2007). 
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RiverGlass has been designed from the intelligence analyst’s 
perspective.  Therefore it is said to be a context-based 
technology.  
As you complete the attached survey you should use 
RiverGlass as your frame of reference. 
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Using a context-based technology product will decrease 
my job performance. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
1. I have found a context-based technology product to be inflexible 
to interact with. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
2. The use of a context-based technology product will increase the 
time I spend collating information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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3. The use of a context-based technology product will improve my 
ability to handle the information available to me. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
4. There are occasions when I put together an intelligence product 
and later see it being reported back to me. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 




5. The use of a context-based technology product will increase the 
number of times I am required to read duplicate information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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6. Using a context-based technology product will make it more 
difficult to handle the number of data sources available to me. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
7. The amount of information available to me is difficult to 
handle. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
8. Using a context-based technology product will make it more 
difficult to do my job. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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9. My productivity is negatively impacted by the amount of times I 
am expected to read duplicate material. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
10.The use of a context-based technology product will decrease the 
time I spend collating information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
11.Using a context-based technology product will decrease my 
effectiveness on the job. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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12.Learning to utilize a context-based technology product would be 
easy for me. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
13.I have found a context-based technology product difficult to 
use. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
14.The number of data sources I am required to check makes it 
difficult for me to provide a timely response  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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15.Using a context-based technology product will make it easier to 
handle the number of data sources available to me.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
16.Seldom am I expected to read duplicate information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
17.I will find a context-based technology product useful in my job. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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18.Using a context-based technology product is complicated. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
19.Using a context-based technology product in my job would enable 
me to accomplish tasks more quickly. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
20.It would be beneficial to me if more data sources were 
accessible through a context-based technology product.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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21.Frequently I am expected to read duplicate information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
22.The use of a context-based technology product will reduce the 
number of times I am required to read duplicate information. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
23.Using a context-based technology product will increase my 
productivity. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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24.It would be easy for me to become skilled at using a context-
based technology product. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
25.The amount of information I am expected to review makes it 
difficult for me to complete strategic analysis. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
26.It is difficult to access the data sources available to me. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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27.The use of a context-based technology product will reduce the 
time I spend collecting information 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
28. I have found it easy to use a context-based technology product 
to obtain decision making material. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
29.The number of data sources available to me is easy to manage. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Undecided 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
31. I have more than 3 years of experience as a criminal 
intelligence analyst.      Yes   No 
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